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1. Introduction 
 
With an average per capita GDP of about $240 ($1,420 in purchasing power parity), 
Nepal is the poorest country of South Asia. About 42 percent of the Nepali population 
lived on income below the poverty line in 1995–96, 46 percent of the adult population 
remains illiterate (Central Bureau of Statistics 2003), and almost half the children five 
years and under are malnourished (Nepal Ministry of Health 2002). During the period of 
stabilization and liberalization in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, the Nepali economy 
grew at about 5 percent per year. The impact of these relatively high rates of economic 
growth on improvements in living standards was dampened by the country’s high 
population and urban-centered growth, limited access to basic services, poor governance, 
and increasing political instability. Economic growth slowed in the early 2000s due to a 
global economic slowdown, diminishing export markets, and the escalation of violence 
resulting in declaration of the state of emergency. 
Despite these negative trends, the overall poverty rate in Nepal declined to about 
30 percent by the end of 2003. Between 1995 and 2004, real per capita expenditures grew 
by more than 40 percent in real terms (The World Bank 2005). That growth in per capita 
expenditure was accompanied by increasing income inequality, as indicated by the Gini 
coefficient, which climbed from 0.34 in 1995 to 0.44 in 2004. The country’s balance of 
payments increased to 9 billion Nepalese rupees (NPR) and foreign currency reserves 
reached NPR 75 billion. The common explanation for these developments, both in the 
press and among local and international scholars, is the sharp increase in remittances 
from Nepali expatriates working abroad. 
Work migration and remittances, along with the higher agricultural growth, are 
usually considered the key factors behind declining poverty in Nepal since 1996. Indeed, 
more than a million prime-age (mostly male) adults are currently working outside Nepal. 
Remittances from expatriates grew at 30 percent per year and from less than 3 percent of 
GDP in 1995 to about 15 percent by the end of 2003 (World Bank 2004), exceeding the 
combined share of tourism, foreign aid, and exports. According to official government 
statistics, about 1 billion dollars comes into the country as remittances, and inflows 
through private and unofficial channels could be even larger (Thieme 2003).  
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Remittances affect economy-wide resource allocation. At the macro level, 
inflation, exchange, and interest rates are determined by the amount of money coming 
into the country in the form of remittances (for example, Djajic 1986). Distributional 
implications of remittances affect the country’s rate of economic growth. At the 
household level, remittances provide a means of achieving consumption smoothing 
(Yang and Choi 2005) and mutual insurance (Stark and Lucas 1988), as well as 
alleviating liquidity constraints (Taylor and Rozelee 2003). Household decisions about 
the labor market activities of household members, investments in human and physical 
capital, fertility, and migration also depend on the amount of remittances the household 
receives (Rapoport and Docquier 2004). 
While a large body of literature on international migration exists, the empirical 
research of the impacts of work-related migration and remittances on poverty and 
inequality is limited. A macro-level study of 74 low- and middle-income countries by 
Adams and Page (2003) find that remittances have strong poverty-reducing impact. 
Adams (1989, 1991) presents micro-evidence on the importance of remittances for 
poverty reduction in rural Egypt, while Adams (2005) summarizes the results of micro-
level analysis in several countries, finding that poverty reduction in Bangladesh, Ghana, 
and Uganda could be attributed to the effects of remittances. Gustafsson and Makonnen 
(1993) report that completely removing remittances in Lesotho would raise the poverty 
rate from 52 to 63 percent, and Barham and Boucher (1998), in examining the net effects 
of migration and remittances on income distribution in Nicaragua, find that migration and 
remittances increase average household income and income inequality when compared 
with the no-migration counterfactuals. Yang, Park, and Wang (2005) studied the effects 
of migration and remittances on poverty in China, finding that without migration and 
remittances the aggregate poverty rate would increase from 14.4 to 15.4 percent. Other 
recent papers by McKenzie and Rapoport (2005) and McKenzie et al. (2006) estimate the 
overall impact of remittances on income distribution in Mexico taking into account their 
direct and indirect effects on receiving households and the spillover effects on 
neighboring communities.  
The growing numbers of domestic and international migrants who secure work 
and send remittances back home have a profound effect on many socioeconomic, 
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demographic, and political issues in Nepal. It is surprising how little is known about the 
economic effects of the country’s work-related migration and remittances, given the 
interest in the subject by the Nepali government and international development agencies 
involved in the country. We are unaware of any research that formally investigates the 
micro-level relationship between work-related migration and household well-being in 
Nepal. A few, mostly descriptive, studies by Nepali scholars establish no causal 
relationship between work-related migration, remittances, and poverty (for example, 
Acharya 2001 and Chhetry 1999, 2002; see also Kumar 2003). With this paper, the 
intention is to fill this gap by providing empirical evidence of the effect of migration and 
remittances on poverty in Nepal.  
In this endeavor, we rely on two rounds of the nationally representative household 
surveys to measure the impact of increased work-related migration and remittance 
inflows on the economic well-being of Nepali households between 1995 and 2004. More 
specifically, we model the effect of remittances and work migration on household 
consumption and aggregate poverty and inequality rates. Using the cross-sectional 
sample of 2004, we estimate a model of household migration decisions jointly with the 
consumption equations by the method of full information maximum likelihood (FIML). 
The method takes into account unobserved household characteristics that could 
simultaneously affect household migration decisions and household income. We also 
simulate counterfactual expenditure distributions to determine the effect of work-related 
migration on poverty and inequality in Nepal.  
The results of our estimations show that the increase in the number of working 
migrants during the past decade had a significant impact on poverty in Nepal. Almost 20 
percent of the decline in poverty in Nepal between 1995 and 2004 can be attributed to 
increased work-related migration and remittance inflows. If the level of migration and the 
amount of remittances remained at the 1995 level, the poverty rate in Nepal would 
increase from the currently observed 30 percent to 32 percent; the mean per capita 
expenditure would decline from about 15,000 to 14,000 NPR. Almost two-thirds of this 
increase in poverty can be explained by the higher number of the would-be-poor among 
the households with international migrants. Work-related migration and remittances, 
however, have only marginal impact of the changes in income inequality in Nepal. 
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2. Data and Measures 
 
The analysis in this paper is based on the data from two rounds of the Nepal Living 
Standard Survey (NLSS). The NLSS is a nationally representative survey of households 
and communities conducted between June 1995 and June 1996 (NLSS-I) and April 2003 
and April 2004 (NLSS-II) by the Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics with the assistance of 
the World Bank. Both rounds use similar modules to collect data on the household 
consumption of a wide range of food and nonfood items. The survey’s instruments also 
gather detailed information about the demographic composition of the interviewed 
households, the labor status of the household members, their health and educational 
achievements, and various sources of household income, including income in-kind, 
individual wages, and remittance and transfers received in the year preceding the survey. 
The NLSS-II sample includes both cross-sectional and panel components. The 
cross-sectional sample was constructed using a two-stage design based on the 2001 Nepal 
Census sample. The survey’s sample covers 73 districts of Nepal (excluding the Rasuwa 
and Mustang districts). The NLSS-I sample includes information on 3,373 households in 
274 PSUs, while the NLSS-II sample is based on 326 cross-sectional and 95 panel PSUs 
enumerating 3,912 and 1,160 households, respectively.2 
We use total per capita consumption expenditure as an indicator of household 
welfare. Our consumption aggregate includes monthly household expenditures on food 
and nonfood items, imputed housing expenditures, an imputed stream of services from 
durables goods, as well as cash expenditures and imputed expenditures for goods and 
services produced by the household itself. The values of home-produced items are 
calculated as a product of the quantity of each food item and its prevailing local market 
price. The poverty line for the analysis is constructed using cost-of-basic-needs approach. 
To assure comparability over time and across the regions, all monetary indicators 
(household consumption, values of remittances, wages, and so on) are deflated to 2004 all 
Nepal prices. The cost of the poverty basket in 2004 all Nepal prices equals NPR 7,694 
per year per person––equivalent to US$107 or US$590 in PPP (World Bank 2006).  
                                                 
2 For a detailed description of the sample frame and the survey methodology see Central Bureau of 
Statistics (2006). 
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A serious data limitation is that households with migrants can only be identified if 
they reported receiving remittances in the previous year. Three groups of households 
could be misclassified under this definition. The first group consists of households with 
migrants who send no remittances. These could be households with a migrant who has 
just departed and is in the process of establishing him or herself, or households where a 
migrant brings the remittances home rather than sending them. The second group 
comprises households that receive remittances but do not report them. Such households 
might be afraid of revealing information on remittances because of the tax consequences 
or simply due to concerns for personal safety. Finally, some households could receive 
remittances from individuals who are not household members. Classifying the 
households in these three groups as having no migrants would result in biased estimates 
of the impact of work-related migration on household consumption. Although the 
direction of the bias is unclear a priori, the size of the bias is proportional to the sizes of 
these three groups of households. 
To assess the extent of such misclassifications, we compare the proportion of 
migrants in the total population from the 2001 Nepal Census with the proportion of 
households with remittances in the NLSS data. The proportion of domestic migrants in 
the 2001 Census (4.8 percent) is statistically close to the proportion of migrants from 
households receiving domestic remittances in the NLSS (5 percent). The census-
calculated proportion of households with international migrants (14 percent) is lower than 
the reported NLSS proportion of household receiving remittances from abroad (18 
percent). The official statistics report about 1,000,000 prime-age male expatriates 
working outside Nepal. The equivalent NLSS figure is about 900,000. These relatively 
small discrepancies indicate that the bias resulting from misclassified households would 
most likely also be small. More importantly, these results make it feasible to extrapolate 
inferences about the effects of work-related migration on income distribution from 
sample households receiving remittances to those in the general Nepali population.  
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3. Migration and Remittances in Nepal: Descriptive Analysis 
 
The history of foreign employment in Nepal dates back almost 200 years, when Britain 
began recruiting men from the hillsides of Nepal, known as Gorkhas into the British 
armed forces. After India’s independence in 1947, the Indian military also began enlisting 
Nepali men. Currently, about 3,500 Nepali solders serve in the British army and more 
than 50,000 Nepalese are enlisted in the Indian military. India was the first country to 
attract civilian migrants from Nepal. The inflow of working migrants to India has 
increased sharply since the 1950s and 1960s, and India now represents the largest market 
for migration to foreign countries in Nepal (Sheddon 2005).3  
The Foreign Employment Act of 1985 was the first legislative document to 
officially recognize the benefits of international migration (Jha 1999). Around that time, 
foreign labor migration from Nepal extended from India to the countries of the Southeast 
and Far East, and later to Arab Gulf States. The total number of Nepali migrants working 
abroad reached 750,000 in 1997, contributing about NPR 35 billion to the country’s 
economy in form of remittances (Sheddon, Gurung, and Adhikari 2000). The reform of 
the administrative system during 2000 and 2001 resulted in a significant boost in both 
domestic and international migration. Before the reforms, passports could only be 
obtained in the country’s capital, but under the new regulations, district offices were 
given the authority to issue passports and other travel documents (McKenzie 2006). 
Domestic migration has increased in Nepal since the success of government’s 
efforts to control endemic malaria in the Terai in early 1950s. The inter-district migration 
constitutes 13.2 percent of domestic migration (Central Bureau of Statistics 2003), while 
rural–urban migration represents 25.5 percent; rural-to-rural migration, however, is 
significantly higher, at 68.2 percent. The poor rural regions of the mid- and far-west 
underwent a net out-migration, with migrants moving from the mountainous and hillside 
areas to the plains and urban areas. These regions were also the most affected by the 
Maoists insurgency over the past 10 years (Do and Iyer 2007). In the Katmandu valley 
and other urban areas, and in the Terai region, inflows of migrants surpass outflows. 
                                                 
3 The “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” signed by the Indian and Nepali governments in 1950 allowed 
Nepali nationals to enter and work in India without a visa and any job restrictions (Thapliyal 1999). 
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The NLSS is the first and only data source to provide statistically accurate 
estimates of levels of and trends in international work-related migration from Nepal and 
on the amount of money sent home in remittances. According to NLSS, 23 percent of 
households in Nepal received remittances in 1995, and that proportion climbed to about 
32 percent in 2004. Further, the share of households with remittances from abroad grew 
from 10 to 17 percent between the survey’s two rounds. The amount of remittances also 
increased from about NPR 22,000, or 36 percent of mean household yearly consumption 
expenditure in 1995, to NPR 35,000 or 44 percent of mean expenditure in 2004. 
Figure 1 shows the incidence and the amount of remittances by household size for 
1995 and 2004.4 Focusing first on the top panel of the graph, the proportion of 
households receiving remittances grows monotonically with household size. For 
example, in 2004 only about 10 percent of households with two or three members 
received money from abroad, while that proportion is more than three times higher for 
households with 11 or more members. The changes in the amounts of remittances by 
household size are shown on the lower panel of the graph. The plot indicates that in 1995 
households with different sizes received almost the same amount of money, while the 
2004 data show that remittances increase with household size. 
The incidence of remittances is higher in rural than in urban Nepal. The 
proportion of households receiving remittances from within the country increased only 
marginally between 1995 and 2004, and even declined in Kathmandu (top section of 
Table 1). At the same time, the share of households receiving money from abroad 
increased uniformly across the country. For example, the rural eastern hills––the poorest 
region in Nepal––registered a fourfold increase in the number of households receiving 
money from abroad; that proportion more than doubled in “other urban areas” of Nepal. 
Thus, the overall increase in the proportion of households with remittances could almost 
entirely be attributed to the growth of remittances from abroad. There is no clear pattern 
in the distribution of the household recipients of the remittances by the size of 
landholdings. The largest increase in the incidence of both domestic and international 
remittances is registered among households with two and more hectares of land. 
                                                 
4  The size of households with migrants was adjusted for the missing migrant members. 
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 Looking at the proportions of households receiving remittances by caste (bottom 
part of Table 1), Dalit households have the highest probability of receiving money from 
outside Nepal (25 percent), while the incidence of external remittances is much lower 
among Newars and Terai Janjatis. At the same time, only 10 percent of Dalit households 
receive remittances from Nepal. This might suggest that poor job opportunities at home 
prompt Dalit households to concentrate their job search efforts abroad. 
 Individual profiles constructed using NLSS data reveal that almost all 
international migrants are male (97 percent) aged 15 to 44 years, and either sons or 
husbands of the person receiving remittances. Brothers represent about 10 percent of the 
total number of donors. In 1995, 85 percent of Nepali migrants worked in India, and the 
rest were spread among Malaysia (11 percent), Bhutan, and Hong Kong. As of 2004, 
international migrants were living in 10 countries: 65 percent worked in India, 18 percent 
in Arab countries, and about 2 percent in United Kingdom, while some migrants lived as 
far away as Japan and the United States. Remittances from abroad constituted 76 percent 
of the total amount of remittances received in Nepal in 2004. The largest share of 
international remittances came from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates 
(35 percent), followed by 30 percent from India, 17 percent from other Asian countries, 
and the remainder from United Kingdom, United States, and other countries. 
 The correlations between household income and the incidence and amount of 
remittances are shown in Figure 2. The main difficulty in illustrating this relationship is 
that current income is endogenous to the remittances. We attempt to address this problem 
by constructing a two-year-lagged asset index to proxy for pre-migration income.5 
Overall, the incidence of remittances (or migration) is higher among (asset) poor 
households. It reaches 44 percent for the poorest households in Nepal and declines 
monotonically to about 10 percent for the richest households. The correlation between the 
amount of remittances and household wealth goes in the opposite direction. Households 
with the highest lagged asset index receive significantly larger amounts of money from 
working migrants than do poor households. These results, however, could indicate that 
                                                 
5 The lagged asset index was constructed based on the estimated cash value of the flow of services provided 
by the durable goods. In our calculations, we included only durable assets purchased by households at least 
two years prior the date of the survey (2001 and older). In justifying the exogeneity of the lagged asset 
index, the fact that the major increase in work migration in Nepal was initiated by the reforms of the 
administrative system of 2001 was taken into consideration (see Section 3).  
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households receiving the largest remittances have been receiving them for a long time, 
resulting in an accumulation of durable assets (Stark 1978).  
 
4. Work-Related Migration and Poverty: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical 
Specification 
 
Remittances sent home are the most tangible benefit of work-related migration for Nepali 
households. On the production side, remittances enable households to overcome the 
constraints of credit and risk on their ability to engage into modern and more productive 
activities (Stark 1991). Remittances can be spent on housing and schooling, and a 
significant proportion directly supports household consumption. But remittances are only 
one of the consequences of migration. When a young, able, and productive male 
household member leaves home, multiple adjustments need to be made among those left 
behind. Migration changes the relative productivity of the remaining household members; 
affects household preferences in terms of risk aversion and uncertainty; and provides new 
information––for example, on new technology, type of crops, and so on. Women who 
previously worked in the labor market may find it optimal to stop working and devote all 
their time to home production (Nandini 1999). Agricultural households might decide to 
augment their income with off-farm activities. Migration also has implications for the 
health and educational attainment of the migrant’s children (Hilderbrandt and McKenzie 
2004; McKenzie and Rapoport 2005).  
The observed consumption behavior and poverty status of the household receiving 
remittances are determined by the cumulative effects of all these changes. Finding valid 
instruments to disentangle the effect of remittances from the overall impact of migration 
on household well-being can be problematic. Even if such instruments exist, the question 
of the effect of migration on household well-being has more policy relevance than a 
narrower question focusing only on the effect of remittances. The goal of this study is to 
analyze the impact of work-related migration and remittances on the consumption of 
households at home and to estimate the effects of work-related migration on aggregate 
poverty and inequality in Nepal. As in any impact assessment, the welfare impact of 
work-related migration should be judged relative to the counterfactual of what have been 
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observed in its absence. In particular, we model how the observed income distribution 
compares to the counterfactual distribution without migration or remittances. 
Our theoretical framework relies on several assumptions. First, we assume that 
households have a choice to send a migrant to work within Nepal or abroad. This 
assumption imposes certain restrictions on the sample for empirical estimations. We also 
assume that migration has to be planned ahead. Before the migration takes place, multiple 
arrangements need to be made. If traveling abroad, a Nepali migrant has to apply for and 
obtain a visa, get an international passport, and purchase a ticket. And a migrant’s 
household incurs expenses in the form of migration broker fees and traveling costs 
(Bhattarai 2005).6 This preparation process could take several years depending on the 
country of destination. This assumption is crucial for our identification strategy. 
Consider a simple two-period model of household utility maximization.7 In time 
period 1, a household decides that one of its members will migrate. This involves three 
possible states: migration abroad, migration within Nepal, and no migration. Each state 
has an associated cost for a household. Such costs could, in case of migration, include 
transportation costs, visa and document processing fees, money to cover initial expenses, 
and so on. To decide whether to embark on migration or not, a household compares its 
expected net benefits in each state (in period 2) and selects the state with a highest utility 
payoff. Households observe the realized labor market outcomes in time period 2: once 
settled in the new location, migrants inform households about their wages and local 
market conditions become known. With this information, households make decisions 
about member participation and market work hours and investment, adjusting their 
consumption level accordingly. 
In the simplest form, a household chooses between two states: to send or not send 
a household member to work in another location, whether locally or abroad. Let U be the 
household utility function which depends on household consumption (Ct) and the 
household characteristics Xt in period t (t=0,1). The household income Yt comprises both 
wage and nonwage income, as well as income from home-production. R is the expected 
                                                 
6 Fees to obtain travel documents, such as entry and identity cards charged by intermediaries vary by 
country and could be as high as US$15,000 (Yamanaka 2000).  
7 Several studies provide strong support for the argument that migration is a household utility maximization 
decision (for example, Stark and Levhari 1982 Low 1986; Hoddinott 1994; Agesa and Kim 2001; 
Bhattacharyya 2005;). 
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benefits of migration (which could be both positive and negative, including remittances 
and other consequences of migration). Let z define a set of regional factors affecting the 
cost of migration P(X0,z0) ( ' 0zP < ) assumed at period 0. Both P and R are equal to zero in 
the case of no migration. The maximization of the household utility function can then be 
expressed in the form: 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0[ ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( , )), ( ( )) ( ( ))]Max U Y X R X U Y X P X z U Y X U Y X+ + − +     (1) 
The first term in parenthesis is the household’s indirect utility if it decides to proceed 
with migration, and the second term is the indirect utility in the case of no migration. The 
obvious predictions from this model are that the reduction in the cost of migration, P, and 
the higher expected returns from migration increase the probability of a household 
choosing to send a migrant. This simple specification can be extended to cases with more 
than two states of migration. We allow for three states of migration: international 
migration, migration inside Nepal, and no migration. 
We assume that utility of a household in state s can be linearly approximated as 
, 1,2,3is i s i s isU X Z sγ ς η= + + =     (2) 
where Zi is the vector of household characteristics that includes both Xi and zi, γ and ς are 
vectors of unknown parameters, s is an indicator describing household migration choice, 
and ηi•’s are the error terms. The household selects the migration state s if 
max( ) , 1,2,3is ij j sU U s≠> =     (3) 
Consumption Cis in a particular state is observed only if that state is chosen: 
, 1,2,3 max( )is s i is is ij j sC X s if U Uβ μ ≠= + = >     (4) 
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables that determine the household consumption 
level, βs is a vector of parameters, and μi•‘s are the error terms.  
The estimation of equation (4) in three states (migration abroad, migration within 
Nepal, and no migration) using ordinary least squares (OLS) enables inferences to be 
made about the returns to the observed household characteristics in each state under the 
assumption that the error terms in equations (2) and (4) are independent––that is, if we 
assume no systematic unobserved differences in household characteristics by migration 
state. Then it is possible to predict the counterfactual consumption levels for households 
in the sample if international, internal or no migration decisions have been made. The 
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probability of a household choosing migration state s could be estimated by a standard 
multi-nomial model. The inferences about the aggregate impact of work migration on 
poverty and inequality might also be obtained (see, for example, Adams 1991, 2005 and 
Taylor and Wyatt 1996).  
However, some unobserved household and/or potential migrant characteristics 
could affect both the household’s decision to migrate and the household’s consumption.8 
For example, it might be optimal for a household to send a member with high 
entrepreneurial abilities abroad. These abilities, which are usually unobserved by a 
researcher, could also allow a migrant to earn higher wages in comparison with the 
average migrant worker and send more money back home. The challenge for our 
empirical strategy is to estimate the system of equations (2)–(4) controlling for such 
unobserved factors.   
Being incorporated into the error terms in equations (2) and (4), the unobserved 
factors can be correlated. If error terms μ’s and η’s are not independent, the nonrandom 
selection of households into different states will result in a correlation between the 
explanatory variables X and errors μ’s in equation (4). In that case, the OLS estimates of 
consumption equation (4) are biased. To obtain unbiased and consistent parameter 
estimates under an assumption of joint dependence of the error terms, we use the method 
of full information maximum likelihood (FIML). The method estimates the household 
consumption equations jointly with the equation describing the household choice of 
migration state allowing for the correlation of the error terms across equations. The 
detailed discussion of our estimation methodology is shown in Appendix 1. 
 To estimate the impact of remittances and migration on poverty and inequality in 
Nepal, we simulate the counterfactual expenditure distributions under different migration 
scenarios. The FIML estimation of equations (2)–(4) identifies the parameters of five-
variate distribution of the error terms. The observed outcomes of the migration decision 
                                                 
8 Migrant selection was studied by Chiswick (1978), and Borjas (1987, 1990, 1991) developed a model of 
self-selection based on unobserved migrant characteristics. The problem of self-selection of migrants was 
also studied by Docquier and Rapoport (1998), Aydemir (2003) and Kanbur and Rapoport, (2005). Barham 
and Boucher (1998) build their model on the assumptions of potential endogeneity of household’s 
migration and labor force participation decisions. A recent study by McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman 
(2006) using the survey of the winners of a migration lottery concludes that migrants are positively selected 
in terms of both observed and unobserved skills. 
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truncate the joint distribution of consumption for each individual. Though analytical 
expressions for such truncated distributions are unattainable, we recover the distributions 
by randomly drawing the error terms from the five-variate truncated normal with 1,000 
replications. This way, we generate the simulated universe of 3,620,000 household 
expenditures with a different realization of conditional errors. The poverty rates and Gini 
coefficients (or any other statistic) could then be calculated for the particular 
counterfactual scenario. Confidence intervals for the inequality and poverty measures are 
estimated by the jackknife method (see Appendix 2 for the detailed description of the 
simulation technique). 
 
Identification Strategy 
 
Our theoretical model guides an identification strategy for the empirical estimation. The 
fact that migration and consumption decisions are separated in time allows us to assume 
that certain factors (variables) affecting the migration decision in time period 1 have no 
direct impact on household consumption in period 2. Such variables could be used as 
instruments in the FIML estimation of equations (2)–(4). A variation in these 
instrumental variables would identify the causal effects of migration and remittances on 
household consumption because the effect of this variation is entirely channeled through 
household migration decision. We use two instruments to identify the separate effects of 
international and domestic migration on household consumption.  
The first instrument, the proportion of migrants in a ward in 2001, is constructed 
based on information from 2001 Nepal Census (Central Bureau of Statistics 2003). The 
proportion of households with migrants in a village in 2001 could be interpreted as a 
proxy for the extent of village-level networks. We argue that 2004 household 
consumption should not be directly affected by the migration networks in 2001. 
Carringon, Detragiache, and Vishwanath (1996) and Munshi (2003) test the role of 
networks in promoting migration and find a greater propensity toward migration in 
villages with existing migrants––meaning that there is propensity for new migrants to 
follow in the footsteps of existing migrants. When in the host country, Nepali migrant 
workers develop extensive social networks that link them with their relatives and friends 
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at home (Yamanaka 2003). Such networks lower the costs of migration for villagers by 
providing information about job opportunities outside Nepal, helping potential migrants 
secure employment, supplying credit to cover reallocation expenses, and ameliorating 
housing costs upon arrival. Indeed, as Thieme (2003) shows, in Nepal, migrants tend to 
follow their co-villagers and migrate to the same destinations. They are also likely to fill 
the same niches in the labor market in the host county. Relying on a similar identification 
strategy, Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2005) analyze the 
effects of migration on children’s health and schooling outcomes in Mexico; Du et al. 
(2005) study the relationship between migration and rural poverty in China; and Taylor 
and Mora (2006) investigate the effect of migration on expenditure patterns of rural 
households in Mexico. We expect this instrument to affect the probability of international 
migration and have small or no influence on the probability of migration within Nepal. 
 To construct an instrument for the domestic migration, we use data from the first 
round of the NLSS. The variable for this instrument is the proportion of domestic 
migrants in a district in 1995.9 The underlying rationale is similar to the one discussed 
above, and we expect this instrument to have a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of domestic migration. 
Our identification strategy requires that lagged migrant networks influence 
household consumption only through current migration. The presence of ward or district 
characteristics or shocks that simultaneously influence migration and household 
consumption decisions would violate our identification restrictions. For example, better 
road infrastructure in a ward or its proximity to a large urban center could reduce the 
costs of migration and, at the same time, affect a household’s returns on productive 
activities by providing better access to markets. We endeavor to control for time-
persistent unobserved factors by including a set of ward-level characteristics in our 
empirical specification. In particular, we include variables that specify local labor-market 
conditions, the occupational structure of the population in a ward, and the set of dummies 
for aggregated educational levels. In addition, we use the ward-level lagged (1995) mean 
expenditure and expenditure Gini. These variables describe the lagged regional poverty 
                                                 
9 We also tried to add the proportion of migrants abroad in a district in 1995 as an instrument. This variable 
adds no extra identification power to our estimations, most likely because of a low level of variation in 
foreign migration registered in 1995.   
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situation and can capture many unobserved factors affecting both the household’s 
migration decision and its current consumption level. Nevertheless, we cannot completely 
rule out the presence of latent local characteristics that are correlated with our 
instruments and simultaneously affect household migration and consumption behavior. 
We can speculate about the effects of unobservable time-variant characteristics on 
our results. By having a larger number of households with a migrant worker, locations 
with extensive migrant networks receive more remittances compared to those with fewer 
migrants. If invested in the development of local infrastructure, remittances would raise 
the local capital stock, and that in turn might positively affect residents’ current earnings 
and incomes (see for example, Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002). Past migration could 
also influence current consumption through its effect on the local labor market. Higher 
levels of remittances may increase aggregate demand and hence the demand for labor 
(Funkhauser 1992). The out-migration of prime-age males might tighten local labor 
markets, allowing better job opportunities for workers in the home communities.  
Both scenarios would lead to a downward bias in our estimates. The consumption 
levels of nonmigrant households living in locations with more migrants would be 
positively affected by externalities related to work-related migration and remittances. The 
counterfactual consumption of a household with a migrant––that is, had that migrant 
stayed home––would be overestimated because of these externalities, thereby reducing 
the estimated impact of migration and remittances. In that case, our results would provide 
lower bounds for the true effect of work-related migration on household consumption. 
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption of separability of household’s 
migration and consumption decisions. In our model, households first decide about the 
work-related migration of its members and then about the household consumption. In the 
alternative framework of life-cycle maximization with perfect foresight and endogenous 
migration decision (Mesnard 2004) the exclusion restrictions for our instruments would 
not be valid. We can argue, however, that the sequential model of household 
decisionmaking better describes the behavior of households in a highly uncertain political 
and economic environment of Nepal.   
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Explanatory Variables and the Sample for Estimations 
 
The predictions of the theoretical model determine the choice of our explanatory 
variables. The descriptive statistics for the main explanatory variables used in our 
analysis are reported in Table 2. These variables could be grouped conceptually into two 
categories. The first group describes factors affecting the household production. These 
include the household demographics, education of female household members, and 
variables describing ethnicity.10 We also include variables on a lagged household land 
ownership and lagged asset index as proxies for household wealth. The lagged asset 
index was constructed based on the estimated cash value of the flow of services provided 
by the durable goods. In our calculation, we include durable assets purchased by 
households at least two years prior the date of the survey (2001 and older). We then 
divided all households in our sample into four groups according to the percentiles of their 
lagged asset index. The fact that the major increase in migration in Nepal happened after 
the administrative reform of 2001 (see Section 3) helps to justify the exogeneity of this 
variable in our model. Our specification also contains a variable on the per capita amount 
of pensions a household received over the past year. The second group of variables 
comprises characteristics related to the region and ward. 
We restricted our sample to households that actually have or could have a 
working migrant. We excluded 30 households from the sample because they represented 
migrants living alone. We also excluded 235 households without migrants whose 
members were not of working age (that is, children and the elderly). Using the language 
of impact evaluation, we therefore only estimate the “LATE” effect of work-related 
migration and remittances on the well-being of Nepali households. 
                                                 
10 The demographic characteristics are adjusted to reflect the pre-migration status of the households. In 
particular, for households with a migrant, we increased household size by one to account for a migrant 
member. All shares of members from different age and gender groups are changed accordingly. Because 
we have no information on a migrant other than his age, we could not include any variables on 
characteristics of the household head or on other male members.  
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5. Results 
 
The results of the FIML estimation of equations (2)–(4) are shown in Table 3 (discrete 
part of the model) and Table 4 (continuous part of the model).11 Focusing first on the 
results for the choices of migration states, households living in wards with a historically 
higher proportion of international migrants are significantly more likely to migrate 
abroad compared with households without migrants. Households residing in districts with 
larger shares of domestic migrants are more likely to send their members to work in 
locations within Nepal. This relationship is consistent with the predictions of our 
theoretical model and indicates that our instruments have a significant effect on the 
households’ choice of migration status.  
Large households and households with a higher proportion of adult women and 
the elderly are more likely to have a migrant. Compared with Brahman and Chhetri, other 
castes are less likely to migrate within Nepal, and the Newars appear to prefer not to 
migrate abroad. Land ownership does not affect the probability or destination of work-
related migration, whether locally or abroad. The probability of a household having a 
domestic migrant is higher among poorer households compared with wealthier 
households (based on the percentiles of the lagged asset index). Poor households are also 
less likely to have members working abroad. At the same time, individuals from both the 
poorest (those who reported no durables) and the wealthiest households are more likely to 
work abroad. We might speculate that the members of the wealthy households tend to 
migrate to Gulf States, while the poorest migrants mainly work in India.  
The estimations reveal the expected geographical patterns of migration. 
Individuals residing in Katmandu are less likely to migrate compared with those living in 
other areas of Nepal. This could be attributed to better labor market conditions in the 
country’s capital. The probability of international migration is higher among households 
                                                 
11 According to the likelihood-ratio test, the specification that assumes that the error terms in equations (2)–
(4) are independent is rejected in favor of the FIML estimation. The estimation results of the system of 
equations (2)–(4) assuming joint independence of the error terms are provided in Appendix 3. Three 
pairwise tests of the equality of coefficients between the regressions in equation (5) are rejected with at 
least 0.01 percent significance.  
We attempted to estimate the system of equations (2)–(4) using a Semi-Parametric Maximum 
Likelihood estimator (for example, Mroz 1999), which relaxes the assumption of joint normality of the 
error terms in these equations. However, we were unable to achieve convergence even with the minimal 
number of points of support. For that reason, we reverted to the more restrictive FIML estimator.  
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from the rural western mountains and hills. Households in wards with a higher proportion 
of illiterate residents are less likely to have a member migrate to locations within Nepal, 
and households in the wards with a large share of self-employed residents are more likely 
to have members migrate for work within Nepal. 
 Table 4 shows the results of the FIML estimation of consumption equations for 
the three states of migration. Overall, the observed household characteristics, in particular 
geographical and ward characteristics play a more important role in determining the level 
of consumption in households without migrants compared with those with a migrant. 
While a household’s human and productive capital has a strong effect on consumption in 
households without migrants, these factors become less important for households with a 
migrant when remittances contribute a significant share to the household budget. The log-
likelihood test rejects the equality of the coefficients in the consumption regressions for 
international and domestic migrants. This justifies the assumptions of our theoretical 
model about the differences in returns on productive and human capital characteristics 
between international and domestic migrants. 
The demographic composition of the household and particularly its dependency 
ratio have a significant impact on per capita consumption expenditure. Households with 
larger shares of children aged 0 to 3 years have lower per capita consumption relative to 
households with either no children or older children.12 Household demographics seem to 
have a stronger effect on consumption in households without migrants or with migrants 
abroad. Households with larger shares of all groups other than small children and those 
with better educated female members have higher per capita consumption levels. 
The size of landholdings has a positive and significant impact on household 
consumption regardless of migration state. For households with international migrants, 
those possessing more than two hectares of land have significantly higher per capita 
consumption compared with landless households. Looking at the coefficients on the 
lagged asset index dummies, households from the upper percentiles of the index have 
                                                 
12 Clearly, the effects of household demographic variables will be different if we adjust for scale economies 
based on household size. This could be relevant in the context of Nepal where the majority of the 
population lives in large households. However, currently there are no studies that assess the magnitude of 
economies of scale in Nepal, so we rely on the standard per capita definition for Nepal.  
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higher per capita expenditure regardless of migration status. Households receiving 
pensions are better off in all three migration groups. 
Our estimations also demonstrate strong regional variation in the level of 
household consumption for households without migrants: households residing in 
Katmandu have lower levels of consumption expenditures compared with households 
from other regions of Nepal. For households with international and domestic migrants, 
the regional effects are less pronounced. Interestingly, the coefficients on the distance-to-
market variable are insignificant in the estimation of the probability to migrate and only 
significant in the consumption equation of households without migrants. These results 
seem to contradict the work of Fafchamp and Shilpi (2003) who find strong correlations 
between the distance to markets and the level of well-being of Nepali households. 
Finally, certain local economic conditions seem to be significantly correlated with 
levels of household well-being. For example, households in wards with a high proportion 
of illiteracy are significantly poorer compared with the households in wards where the 
population is more highly educated. Households either without migrants or with domestic 
migrants residing in wards with larger shares of self-employment are comparatively 
worse-off.  
 
Simulations 
 
Using the estimated parameters of the system of equations (2)–(4), we simulate the effect 
of migration and remittances on distribution of per capita consumption under various 
counterfactual regimes of migration. Different levels of domestic and international 
migration are simulated through the changes in the values of the two instruments. When 
predicting household expenditures in a counterfactual state with no migration we increase 
the household size to adjust for the presence of a would-be-migrant, as well as all 
variables constructed using the household size and shares of various age-gender groups. 
A detailed discussion of the simulation technique is presented in Appendix 2. 
We construct four counterfactual scenarios (Table 5). The first column of Table 5 
shows the actual rates of poverty, mean expenditure, and inequality for households 
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exhibiting the three different states of migration.13 In 2004, 29.9 percent of the Nepali 
population had per capita consumption expenditure below the poverty line; average per 
capita consumption was NPR 14,930 per year, and the consumption Gini inequality 
reached 0.409.  
In the scenario of no migration (the second column in Table 5), households with a 
migrant have the same returns on their observed characteristics as household without a 
migrant: the size of the migrant households is increased by one, and remittances are set to 
zero. Our simulations show that without migration the overall poverty rate in Nepal 
would have increased from the current 30.0 to 33.6 percent. The share of poverty among 
households with a domestic migrant would have risen to about 46 percent, and for 
households with an international migrant poverty would have increased to 35 percent. 
Overall, inequality would remain virtually unchanged. The consumption expenditure of 
households without a migrant would remain unaffected, while the average consumption 
of households with domestic or international migrants would fall.  
 The second counterfactual scenario models changes in expenditure distribution 
had the levels of migration and remittances remained unchanged between 1995 and 2004. 
The values of our two instruments are adjusted such that the proportions of domestic and 
international migrants are the same in 2004 as they were in 1995.14 This scenario results 
in higher overall poverty (a change from 30.0 to 31.8 percent), and higher poverty rates 
both among households with domestic migrants (a change from 22.9 to 30.0 percent) and 
among those with international migrants (32.8 to 37.2 percent). Inequality would slightly 
decline to Gini 0.407. We can decompose the change in poverty between 1995 and 2004 
into 3 components. These components represent the contributions of the changes in the 
levels of domestic and international migration (non-migrant households sending a 
                                                 
13 The three groups of households in Table 5 are defined based on their observed (actual) household 
migration outcome. Poverty and inequality statistics are calculated for these household groups under all 
counterfactual scenarios. For example, the poverty rate for households without migrants remains 
unchanged between actual and no migration scenarios. The counterfactual poverty rate of 30.5 percent 
should be interpreted as the poverty rate for households without migrants in the observed state. At the same 
time, the poverty rate for a group of households with a migrant within Nepal increased from 22.4 to 45.6 
percent, which shows the change in poverty status for households from this group under the counterfactual 
scenario when all migrants stay home. 
14 Theoretically we cannot guarantee the uniqueness of the solution for this nonlinear problem. It appears 
that in our case there is only one combination of the values of the instruments that solves this problem 
within the data range. 
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migrant) to the total poverty change, and the interaction component15. This 
decomposition demonstrates that the increase in international migration between 1995 
and 2004 decreased the total poverty by 1.2 percentage points, while the increase in 
internal migration and the interaction component are responsible for a 0.6 percentage 
point reduction in poverty in Nepal. 
 The last two columns of Table 5 present the results of simulations for the 
hypothetical scenarios of a 10-percentage point growth in the levels of domestic and 
international migration. These simulations are based on implicit assumptions that this 
growth is caused by a decrease in the cost of migration and that the average amount of 
remittances a migrant sends home remains constant. Both scenarios lead to lower overall 
poverty rates, but the impact of the increase in the rate of domestic migration is larger. 
Poverty in Nepal would be reduced by 2.4 percentage points if domestic migration were 
10 percent higher, and poverty would decline by 0.5 percentage points if international 
migration were 10 percentage points higher. Both scenarios lead to rising inequality.  
The important conclusion that emerges from these simulations is that the elasticity 
of poverty reduction in Nepal over the past decade is significantly higher for domestic 
migration than it is for international migration. One explanation for the different effects 
of domestic and international migration on poverty could be that remittances derived 
from work in foreign countries are more likely to be invested in productive assets and 
real estate. This is often attributed to the notion that households receiving international 
remittances tend to treat such funds as positive transitory income shocks that should be 
invested. Local remittances are treated as a mixture of transitory and permanent income 
and are more often used both for investment and for consumption (Alderman 1996). On 
the other hand, the surge of investment in housing that creates new employment and 
income opportunities for the local labor force could have a positive impact on local 
poverty rates (Adams 1998). Our estimation strategy, however, overlooks such effects. It 
is not clear whether our results would hold if the general equilibrium consequences of 
changes in migration and remittances were taken into account.  
In attempts to disentangle heterogeneity in the impact on poverty of migration and 
remittances, we present simulated poverty rates for different types of households (Table 
                                                 
15 This decomposition is similar to the poverty decomposition by Ravallion and Huppi (1991). 
 23
6). Households with a migrant living in other urban areas of Nepal and in rural western 
Terai experienced the most significant boost in consumption. Dalit households appear to 
gain less from sending their members to work in other regions of Nepal or abroad. 
Relative to the counterfactual scenario of no migration, landless (probably urban) 
households or those owning large land plots seem to benefit more from migration.  
With an estimated increase in poverty of 3.6 percentage points, based on the 
counterfactual of no migration, the impact of changes in migration for work (together 
with associated remittances) in Nepal is somewhat lower than the estimated impacts for 
other countries, even though most of these studies estimate the impact of remittances 
only. Adams (2005) attributes the effect of remittances to 5 percentage points of poverty 
reduction in Ghana, 6 percentage points in Bangladesh, and 11 percentage points in 
Uganda. Completely removing remittances would raise poverty rates by 8 percent points 
in Lesotho, while the poverty rate in poor areas of China would increase by 1 percentage 
point in the absence of migration and remittances (Yang, Park, and Wang 2005). On a 
macro level, Adams and Page estimate the remittance elasticity of poverty to be of 
around –0.35. Our model predicts a slightly higher elasticity of –0.51.   
 
Sensitivity Analysis and Caveats 
  
Our main empirical specification relies on stringent assumptions that limit our estimation 
sample and restrict the set of exogenous variables included in the model. In this section 
we demonstrate how our results would change if these assumptions are relaxed. In 
particular, we compare the results discussed in the previous section with the results of 
simulations based on a specification that assumes no correlation between the error terms 
in the system of equations (2)–(4); the specification that explicitly includes the amount of 
remittances (both instrumented and uninstrumented); and the specification classifying 
migrants to India as domestic migrants. The counterfactual poverty rates under various 
migration scenarios simulated for these empirical specifications are shown in Table 7.16  
                                                 
16 The simulated results for inequality and mean consumption expenditures for these specifications are 
available from the authors on request. The results of FIML estimations of the system of equations (2)–(4) 
under different specifications are shown in Appendix 3.  
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The comparison of the main simulation results (Table 5) with simulations under 
an assumption of a joint independence of the error terms in equations (2)–(4) reveals a 
systematic relationship between the decision to migrate and the level of household 
consumption, which is not accounted for by observed household characteristics. The 
differences in the returns on unobserved characteristics of households with a migrant 
between the actual and counterfactual scenarios account for more than 60 percent of the 
total impact that work-related migration and remittances have on aggregate poverty 
rates.17 This indicates significant self-selection on unobservable characteristics that 
provide higher returns to the households if one of their members migrates.  
We simulate the counterfactual distribution of consumption using a specification 
that explicitly includes remittance amounts in a set of explanatory variables. The results 
of this estimation are biased because remittances could be endogenous to consumption 
and are most likely badly measured in our data. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the 
estimated effects of migration and remittances are similar for this and our preferred 
specification. Under the counterfactual of no migration, the poverty rate increases by 4.5 
percentage points versus 3.6 percentage points in the preferred specification. For the 
1995–96 scenario, the simulated changes in poverty rates based on a specification that 
includes remittance amounts are equal to 1.4 percentage points, while the preferred 
specification predicts about a 1.9 percentage point change in poverty. The simulated 
poverty rates under the specification where the amount of remittances is instrumented 
with the age of a migrant are very close to the poverty rates obtained from 
uninstrumented specification. 
We next compare our main results with the simulations based on an unrestricted 
sample. We find that including the previously excluded households in our estimation 
(that is, those without men of working age and those consisting only of single men) 
increases the poverty rates in the counterfactual scenarios. Overall, however, the 
simulated poverty impact of migration for the unrestricted sample is consistent with our 
main results. Note that the actual poverty rate in that scenario is different from the 
poverty rates in other scenarios because it is calculated using a larger sample. 
                                                 
17 This result was calculated by comparing the simulated magnitudes of poverty reduction between the 
FIML and OLS specifications.  
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Finally, we test the sensitivity of our results for the alternative classification of 
households by migration destination, whereby migrants to India are categorized as 
domestic migrants. The concern here is that characteristics of migrants to India could be 
similar to the characteristics of domestic migrants. Such migrants predominantly come 
from the rural Terai region of Nepal and are usually involved in agricultural or manual 
labor for low wages. At the same time, Nepalese working in Arab countries in the Gulf 
and the Far East are educated, employed in the better paying jobs, and can send more 
money home. Hence, combining households with migrants from India with those from 
other countries potentially underestimates the impact of international migration.  
The comparison of simulations based on this alternative categorization with those 
based on the preferred specification results in relatively small differences in the simulated 
poverty rates. The increase in the poverty rate under the scenario of no migration is 
smaller (2.8 percentage points) compared with the increase in poverty simulated with the 
preferred specification (3.6 percentage points). The scenario using 1995/96 levels of 
migration resulted in a 1.8 percentage point increase in poverty in the specification 
reclassifying Indian migrants versus a 1.9 percentage point increase using the 
specification classifying migrants to India as international migrants. 
There are several qualifications to and possible caveats on our results. First, our 
results are obtained using the 2004 cross-sectional data. We have no instruments to 
control for possible household- or community-level endogeneity. In this sense, our 
estimations of the impact of work-related migration are valid only to the extent that 
unobserved family and community characteristics are captured by the variables included 
in our empirical specification.  
Second, our analysis focuses only on the direct impact of migration and 
remittances on households with a migrant. Migration and remittances improve the 
welfare of households in the sending communities by stimulating local economic 
development. Migrants channel remittances into productive investment at home. Even 
when some households spend most of the remittances on current consumption, the 
resulting demand for goods and services can be met by other working adults in the 
community, thus generating strong positive externalities. We argue that our estimates 
provide lower bounds on the actual impact of migration for work and remittances on 
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poverty in Nepal. Taking into account the general equilibrium consequences of work-
related migration would demonstrate an even larger impact on living standards of Nepal. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper attempts to explain the role of migration and remittances in reducing poverty 
in Nepal between 1995 and 2003. We compared the observed poverty and inequality rates 
with the rates calculated under counterfactual scenarios. To construct these 
counterfactuals we estimated the model of household consumption expenditure 
identifying observed and unobserved differences in the returns on household 
characteristics based on migration status.  
 The results of our simulations show that almost 20 percent of the decline in 
poverty in Nepal between 1995 and 2004 can be attributed to increased work-related 
migration and the resulting remittances sent back home. In the absence of migration, the 
poverty rate in Nepal would increase from the currently observed 30.0 percent to 33.6 
percent, and the mean per capita expenditure would decline from 15,000 to 14,000 NPR. 
Almost 58 percent of the aggregate increase in poverty could be accounted for by a 
higher number of the would-be poor among households with members who migrated 
internationally. Migration and remittances have only a marginal impact on income 
inequality in Nepal. 
 Migration and remittances have a strong impact on the living conditions of 
households with a migrant. The poverty rate among households with a member who 
migrates within Nepal would be twice as high as current levels if the migrant had stayed 
home. The poverty rate for households with a migrant working abroad would also be 
substantially higher had their members not migrated. 
Our findings have important implications for public policy. They emphasize the 
role of migration for work and remittance inflows in raising the living standards of 
recipient families and reducing aggregate poverty in Nepal. Hence, strategies for 
economic growth and poverty reduction in Nepal should incorporate various aspects of 
the migration dynamics. Our results demonstrate that policies promoting both domestic 
migration and the export of labor––if such export were accompanied by remittances––
 27
could also have an important effect on poverty reduction in Nepal. Given that Nepal has 
such a plentiful supply of labor, migration for work provides employment and earning 
opportunities for a significant segment of the labor force. Unless the labor market 
situation changes dramatically, increasing numbers of Nepali men and women will seek 
job opportunities outside Nepal; migration and remittances could be expected to play 
even a greater role in the future economic development of the country. 
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Table 1: Percent of households receiving remittances by regions of Nepal and total 
 Receive remittances  
from Nepal 
Receive remittances  
from abroad 
Receive any 
 remittances 
 1995/96 2003/04 1995/96 2003/04 1995/96 2003/04 
Regions       
   Kathmandu 14.3 7.8 3.6 5.7 17.9 13.5 
   Other urban areas 13.1 17.1 6.0 14.3 19.2 31.3 
   Rural West  mount/hills 10.6 11.1 19.6 29.4 30.2 40.4 
   Rural Eastern mount/hills 11.1 16.9 2.0 9.3 13.1 26.2 
   Rural western Terai 12.0 12.6 10.6 19.2 22.6 31.8 
   Rural eastern Terai 14.7 14.6 11.0 18.1 25.7 32.7 
Land holdings a year ago.          
   No farm plot 11.3 14.8 10.2 13.2 21.4 28.0 
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha 13.1 14.3 11.7 18.5 24.7 32.8 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 11.7 11.7 10.7 20.0 22.5 31.8 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 12.8 13.7 11.4 17.5 24.2 31.2 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  11.9 17.3 6.2 18.3 18.1 35.6 
Caste       
  Brahman\Chhetri 13.4 15.8 11.1 19.9 24.5 35.7 
   Dalit 12.0 9.8 15.1 24.7 27.0 34.5 
   Newar 13.2 14.3 3.6 7.8 16.8 22.1 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  9.8 14.6 9.4 15.4 19.2 30.0 
   Muslim\Other Minorities 13.1 12.1 11.4 18.3 24.4 30.3 
Total 12.3 13.9 10.6 17.7 23.0 31.6 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of main explanatory variables for migrant and non-migrant 
households, 2004 cross-section  
 
Non-Migrant 
households 
Domestic migrant 
households 
International migrant 
household 
 Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. 
Household per capita expenditure x105 1.640 0.036 1.755 0.069 1.606 0.067
Household Demographic (before migration)     
   Household size  5.683 0.050 5.803 0.114 6.491 0.107 
   Share of  children age 0-3 0.092 0.002 0.066 0.004 0.091 0.004 
   Share of  children age 4-7 0.101 0.003 0.062 0.004 0.099 0.005 
   Share of  children age 8-15 0.192 0.004 0.149 0.007 0.163 0.006 
   Share of  adult men 16-64 0.031 0.002 0.080 0.007 0.040 0.004 
   Share of women 16-64 0.286 0.003 0.279 0.006 0.279 0.004 
   Share of  elderly age 65+  0.298 0.003 0.364 0.007 0.328 0.006 
   Number of married couples  1.314 0.014 1.205 0.034 1.491 0.034 
Maximum  education of women  1.011 0.027 1.035 0.057 1.052 0.052 
Ethnicity  
   Brahman/Chhetri 0.290 0.009 0.356 0.021 0.349 0.019 
   Dalit 0.073 0.005 0.058 0.010 0.113 0.013 
   Newar 0.086 0.006 0.076 0.012 0.032 0.007 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  0.273 0.009 0.283 0.020 0.233 0.017 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 0.279 0.009 0.227 0.018 0.273 0.018 
Land holdings a year ago   
   Landless households 0.246 0.009 0.232 0.018 0.174 0.015 
   Farm plot < 0.5 hectares 0.366 0.010 0.374 0.021 0.402 0.019 
   Farm plot: 0.5-1 hectares 0.211 0.008 0.190 0.017 0.224 0.017 
   Farm plot  1-2 hectares 0.121 0.007 0.131 0.015 0.141 0.014 
   Farm plot > 2 hectares 0.056 0.005 0.073 0.011 0.059 0.009 
Lagged durable asset index   
   No assets    0.397 0.010 0.409 0.022 0.431 0.020 
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.222 0.008 0.246 0.019 0.212 0.016 
                      (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.209 0.008 0.216 0.018 0.212 0.016 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.172 0.008 0.129 0.015 0.144 0.014 
Geography dummies  
   Katmandu 0.075 0.005 0.034 0.008 0.018 0.005 
   Other urban areas 0.107 0.006 0.128 0.015 0.084 0.011 
   Rural Western mountains/hills 0.172 0.008 0.170 0.016 0.359 0.019 
   Rural Eastern mountains/hills 0.226 0.008 0.260 0.019 0.111 0.012 
   Rural Western Terai 0.142 0.007 0.127 0.015 0.148 0.014 
   Rural Eastern Terai 0.278 0.009 0.281 0.020 0.280 0.018 
Log Distance to market center 2.095 0.028 2.024 0.057 2.220 0.048 
Per capita pension transfers  0.389 0.050 0.345 0.094 0.655 0.116 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ 0.560 0.004 0.542 0.009 0.569 0.009 
   % literate or 1-4 years of education  0.180 0.002 0.191 0.005 0.187 0.005 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.108 0.001 0.114 0.003 0.114 0.003 
   % employed in wage job 0.145 0.003 0.127 0.005 0.141 0.005 
   % self employed 0.462 0.005 0.492 0.010 0.482 0.009 
   Average log expenditure  8.896 0.007 8.897 0.014 8.826 0.013 
   Gini coefficient  0.312 0.001 0.312 0.003 0.304 0.003 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.565 0.014 0.522 0.023 0.611 0.027 
Number of Observations 2,464 523 633 
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Table 3: FIML estimation of the migration choice part of the system (1-3) 
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 1.059*** 0.285 -0.418 0.333 
   Share of international migrants in a ward,  2001 0.165 0.228 1.266*** 0.192 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.158*** 0.017 0.127*** 0.016 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children 4-7 -0.192 0.371 0.162 0.330 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.058 0.272 -0.416* 0.248 
   Share of men 16-64 1.156*** 0.331 0.236 0.329 
   Share of women 16-64 1.996*** 0.283 1.312*** 0.265 
   Share of elderly  2.952*** 0.345 0.932*** 0.357 
   Number of married couples -0.379*** 0.051 -0.089* 0.049 
Maximum education of women in the household 0.005 0.026 0.024 0.025 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.268** 0.119 0.021 0.101 
   Newar -0.244** 0.106 -0.452*** 0.124 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.161** 0.074 -0.107 0.072 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.281*** 0.085 -0.103 0.080 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.061 0.078 0.036 0.077 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.247*** 0.096 -0.100 0.091 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.144 0.107 -0.029 0.102 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.156 0.132 -0.192 0.132 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.057 0.073 -0.135* 0.071 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.056 0.077 -0.141* 0.075 
   Asset rich   (66th – 100th percentile) -0.324*** 0.096 -0.139 0.091 
Total pensions per capita -0.015 0.012 0.016* 0.008 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.702*** 0.145 0.565*** 0.155 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.563*** 0.190 1.042*** 0.193 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.574*** 0.173 0.479*** 0.184 
   Rural western Terai 0.655*** 0.184 0.739*** 0.189 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.807*** 0.167 0.838*** 0.175 
 Log of distance to market center -0.041 0.027 -0.015 0.025 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.544* 0.312 0.029 0.307 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.556 0.463 0.416 0.448 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.197 0.511 0.405 0.495 
   % employed in wage job -0.053 0.358 0.481 0.315 
   % self employed 0.549** 0.216 -0.031 0.198 
   Log of average household expenditure, 1995 0.063 0.108 0.131 0.105 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.022 0.464 -0.916** 0.435 
 Casualties from conflict, district level -0.024 0.053 -0.036 0.048 
 Constant -3.169*** 1.048 -3.556*** 1.023 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4266.64 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table 4: FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (1-3) 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.120*** 0.014 -0.101*** 0.017 -0.074*** 0.006 
   Share of children  0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children  4-7 0.319 0.217 0.137 0.162 0.175* 0.093 
   Share of children 8-15 0.278* 0.159 0.613*** 0.125 0.359*** 0.069 
   Share of men 16-64 0.161 0.188 0.386** 0.190 0.228** 0.094 
   Share of women 16-64 0.272 0.180 0.493** 0.219 0.748*** 0.091 
   Share of elderly  -0.180 0.201 0.222 0.245 0.260** 0.131 
   Number of married couples 0.150*** 0.040 0.081** 0.036 0.067*** 0.018 
Maximum education of women 0.034** 0.017 0.081*** 0.015 0.086*** 0.007 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.151* 0.088 -0.233*** 0.058 -0.170*** 0.033 
   Newar 0.049 0.070 0.074 0.100 -0.002 0.031 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.075 0.053 -0.125*** 0.047 -0.217*** 0.022 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 0.024 0.059 -0.151*** 0.052 -0.132*** 0.025 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.003 0.053 0.007 0.051 0.062*** 0.022 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.215*** 0.066 0.055 0.062 0.143*** 0.028 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.181*** 0.070 0.120* 0.064 0.206*** 0.032 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.266*** 0.088 0.320*** 0.081 0.330*** 0.040 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.053 0.051 0.070 0.047 0.004 0.022 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.175*** 0.052 0.185*** 0.047 0.167*** 0.023 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.558*** 0.066 0.518*** 0.064 0.491*** 0.028 
Total pensions per capita 0.019** 0.009 0.022*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.003 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas -0.103 0.106 -0.044 0.136 0.195*** 0.041 
   Rural west  mount/hills -0.063 0.136 -0.284 0.176 0.240*** 0.059 
   Rural eastern mount/hills -0.101 0.123 -0.225 0.139 0.114** 0.048 
   Rural western Terai 0.039 0.131 -0.199 0.153 0.218*** 0.053 
   Rural eastern Terai -0.071 0.124 0.002 0.149 0.299*** 0.049 
 Log of distance to market center -0.024 0.019 -0.017 0.016 -0.023*** 0.008 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.250 0.208 -0.239 0.195 -0.369*** 0.089 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education 0.029 0.301 -0.354 0.289 -0.115 0.136 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.516 0.337 -0.329 0.316 -0.603*** 0.148 
   % employed in wage job 0.099 0.274 -0.080 0.185 -0.117 0.098 
   % self employed -0.333** 0.149 -0.144 0.125 -0.223*** 0.064 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.149** 0.073 0.261*** 0.062 0.320*** 0.032 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.339 0.301 0.213 0.258 0.052 0.144 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.081* 0.042 0.027 0.030 -0.010 0.014 
 Constant -0.506 0.751 -1.757** 0.759 -2.782*** 0.314 
Number of observations 3,620 
Log-Likelihood -4,263.98 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table 5: Simulated levels of expenditure, poverty and inequality rates for different 
migration scenarios.  
Migration scenarios Actual No  migration 
Level of  
migration 
as of 1995/96 
+10% point  
increase 
 in  domestic 
migration 
+10% point  
increase 
in 
international 
migration 
Household types Poverty rate (%) 
 
All Households 
 
30.0 33.6* 31.8* 27.6* 29.5 
Households with no 
migrants 30.6 30.6 30.6 27.6
* 29.3 
Households with 
migrants within Nepal 22.9 46.3
* 30.0* 22.9 25.5 
Households with 
migrants abroad 32.8 34.9 37.2 30.7 32.8 
 Average expenditure, NRP 10,000’s 
 
All Households 
 
1.493 1.405* 1.446* 1.561* 1.515 
Households with no 
migrants 1.493 1.493 1.493 1.585
* 1.536 
Households with 
migrants within Nepal 1.576 1.087
* 1.401* 1.576 1.527 
Households with 
migrants abroad 1.441 1.341 1.328 1.478 1.441 
 Inequality rate (Gini) 
 
All  Households 
 
0.409 0.405 0.407 0.412 0.412 
Note: Shaded cells indicate that the poverty rates and average expenditure of these households are not 
affected by the simulated policy changes. 
* indicates that the difference between the actual and simulated values is statistically significant at least 5 
percent level. 
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Table 6: Simulated changes in predicted per capita consumption for different 
counterfactual scenarios by household characteristics (NPR 10,000) 
 Expected consumption 
Conditional on: 
Actual No  migration 
Level of   
migration 
as of  
1995/96 
+10% point   
increase in  
domestic  
migration 
+10% point  
increase in 
international 
migration 
Ethnicity      
   Brahman/Chhetri 1.850 1.752 1.796 1.934 1.872 
   Dalit 1.052 1.033 1.030 1.088 1.059 
   Newar 2.670 2.557 2.611 2.770 2.696 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  1.174 1.068 1.123 1.232 1.205 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 1.254 1.182 1.213 1.316 1.269 
Land holdings a year ago       
   Landless households 1.862 1.737 1.804 1.937 1.891 
   Farm plot < 1 ha 1.296 1.224 1.255 1.362 1.314 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 1.549 1.465 1.501 1.619 1.571 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  1.876 1.762 1.810 1.943 1.912 
Lagged durable asset index      
No Assets 1.021 0.963 0.989 1.068 1.035 
Asset poor  (1 - 33th percentile) 1.076 0.988 1.035 1.142 1.093 
               (33th  - 66th percentile) 1.471 1.380 1.422 1.550 1.491 
Asset rich   (66th - 100th ) 3.104 2.949 3.015 3.210 3.157 
Geography dummies      
   Katmandu  3.495 3.334 3.418 3.591 3.541 
   Other urban areas 2.476 2.291 2.391 2.572 2.527 
   Rural western mount/hills 1.187 1.154 1.157 1.241 1.203 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 1.137 1.064 1.105 1.196 1.150 
   Rural western Terai 1.269 1.177 1.223 1.368 1.280 
   Rural eastern Terai  1.388 1.300 1.336 1.443 1.414 
      
Total 1.493 1.405 1.446 1.561 1.515 
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Table 7: Simulated changes in poverty rates in four migration scenarios estimated under 
the different assumption. 
Migration scenarios Actual No  migration 
Level of  
migration 
as in 1995-
96 
+10% point  
increase in  
domestic 
migration 
+10% point  
increase in  
international 
migration 
 Poverty rate (%) 
Preferred specification 
(from Table 5) 30.0 33.6 31.9 27.3 29.5 
Alternative specifications      
 
Assuming independence of  
error terms in (1-3)  
[Tables A3.1 and A4.1] 
30.1 31.1 30.8 29.9 30.1 
 
Including amounts of 
remittances (not instrumented)  
[Tables A3.2 and A4.2] 
29.0 33.5 30.4 26.9 29.4 
Including amounts of 
remittances instrumented by 
age of a sender 
[Tables A3.3 and A4.3] 
29.5 33.6 30.5 27.2 29.0 
 
Unrestricted Sample  
(3,874 households) 
[Tables A3.4 and A4.4] 
30.0 34.3 32.0 28.0 29.2 
 
Treating India as domestic 
destination 
[Table A3.5 and A4.5] 
29.9 32.7 31.7 28.4 27.2 
Assuming equal returns in 3 
states of migration in 
consumption equations 
[Table A3.6 and A4.6] 
30.1 35.8 31.6 28.3 30.8 
Note: that the “actual” poverty rates are simulations based on the model with the initial values of 
instrumental variables. So, the alternative specifications produce different poverty rates for the 
simulated “actual” scenario. 
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Figure 1: Incidence of migration and amount of remittances by the household size. 
Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals for the means. Histogram of the household 
size on the background of the lower two panels. NLSS 1995 and 2004 
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Figure 2: Non-parametric regression of the incidence of migration and amount of 
remittances by lagged asset index, NLSS 2004 
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Figure 3: Simulated distributions of per capita household expenditure in 
the scenarios of the actual and of no migration by household migration 
status. 
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Appendix 1: The Likelihood function  
 
The condition (3) could be expressed in terms of value functions representing the pair-
wise differences of utility functions (2). Define:  
1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 1
2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2
( )
( )
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
V U U Z Z
V U U Z Z
γ γ η η ϕ ε
γ γ η η ϕ ε
= − = − + − = +
= − = − + − = +     (A.1) 
where φ1,2 are the unknown parameters and ε1,2 are i.i.d. error terms. Migration choices 
and corresponding consumption outcome are observed if:  
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    (A.2) 
Assume that all the random variables in the model are distributed as five-variate normal, 
with the following variance-covariance matrix.  
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where α is a covariance between ε1 and ε2; σ’s are covariances between ε1, ε2 and 
consumption error terms μ1, μ2, μ3; and s’s are covariances between μ1, μ2, μ3. For 
identification, both variances of the errors in (1) are normalized to 1. The covariances s12, 
s13, and s23 are not estimated as we never observe a household’s consumption 
simultaneously in two distinct migration states.  
The probability of observing a particular consumption outcome at a certain 
migration state can be decomposed into the product of conditional and unconditional 
probabilities: 
( , ) ( | ) ( )ki ik i k ik ik ikL P State k C X P State k Pβ μ μ μ= = = + = = ⋅     (A.4)  
The unconditional part of (A.4) is the univariate normal density. After rescaling: 
( ) ( )ik i kik ik ik
kk
C XP C X
s
βμ β ϕ −= − =     (A.5) 
where φ is standard normal density function. The conditional part of (A.4), for example 
for a household choosing state 1, can be expressed as: 
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where 1
jη  and 2jη  are distributed as:  
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After normalization 
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(A.7) can be expressed as a standard bivariate normal: 
1 1 1
1 1 2( 1 | ) ( , , )i i iP State μ η η ρ= = Φ % %     (A.9) 
Then, a contribution to the likelihood function of the observation i in State k is: 
1 2( , , ) ( ), 1,2,3
k k k k ik
i i i
kk
L k
s
μη η ρ φ= Φ =% %     (A.10) 
However, (A.9) and (A.10) are different in every state. Log likelihood is formed as the 
sum of individual log-likelihoods (A.10) over all observations and all states: 
ln ( ), 1 , 1,2,3ki
i k
L L I State k i N k= = = =∑∑ K     (A.11) 
where I is an indicator function for a migration state. To improve the fit of our estimation 
we use the Box-Cox transformation of the continuous dependent variables in our model 
(Heckman and Sedlacek 1990). The “Box-Cox parameter” λ=-0.4 provides best fit in 
terms of minimization of the sum of square residuals of the continuous part of the model.  
The log-likelihood function (A.11) is maximized using a standard Newton-
Raphson algorithm of Maximum Likelihood procedure in Stata. The maximization 
routine relies on analytical gradient and analytical Hessian that we programmed to 
improve convergence properties and speed of the estimation. The performance of 
maximization algorithm is crucial for the jackknife simulations we conduct in the paper∗.  
                                                 
∗ The Stata code that implements the Full Information Maximum Likelihood algorithm is available from 
authors on request.  
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Appendix 2: Simulation techniques 
We treat household expenditure as a random variable that comes from some distribution 
the parameters of which we estimate. This random variable is a sum of observed and 
unobserved components. The observed component is a product of household 
characteristics and the returns on these characteristics in a particular migration state. The 
unobserved component is determined by the choice of the migration state according to 
rules (A.1) and (A.2). We cannot recover the exact value of the unobserved component 
but can only estimate the parameters of the distribution of that component in each 
counterfactual state. We need to simulate the distribution of counterfactual expenditures 
in order to calculate the poverty and inequality measures in various counterfactual 
scenarios.  
 To simulate the expenditure distribution for each household in different states of 
migration we draw error terms ε1, ε2, μ1, μ2, μ3 from unconditional 5-variate normal 
distribution with the estimated variance-covariance matrix (A.3). In every draw m 
household i is assigned to a particular migration state s, according to rule (A.1 and A.2): 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ0; 0
m m
is ij sj i i sj is ik sk i i skU U Z U U Zϕ ε ϕ ε− = + > − = + >     (A.12) 
where ,ˆsj skϕ  are the estimated parameters as in (A.1) and ( ),( )mi sj skε  are the values of the 
error terms in draw m. The expenditure of household i in draw m is: 
ˆm m
is s i isC Xβ μ= +     (A.13) 
So, in every draw only migration choice is realized and the counterfactual expenditure 
derived for that choice. By repeating this process M times for all households in our 
sample we generate the simulated expenditure distribution in all migrations states. Any 
distributional statistics could be calculated using this distribution. For example, the 
simulated poverty rate for households with migrants working outside Nepal in case of no 
abroad migration is: 
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where N is a total number of households in the sample, PL is the poverty line, and I is an 
indicator function. The expressions for other measures of poverty and inequality could be 
derived in a similar way.  
The actual calculation of these statistics is a bit more involved as we use a Box-
Cox transformation for the household expenditures in our estimation. We apply inverse 
of a Box-Cox transformation on the last stage of simulation to obtain poverty and 
inequality measures of a non-transform distribution. The later step is crucial for 
calculation of the measures of inequality and inequality sensitive poverty measures. The 
counterfactual poverty rates could be calculated on the transformed distribution as the 
Box-Cox transformation preserve the expenditure ranking.  
The confidence intervals for poverty and inequality measures are estimated by the 
method of jackknife (e.g. Efron 1981). The jackknife estimate of the parameter θ is given 
by: 
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The jackknife estimate of the standard error of ˆjθ  is 
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where n is the sample size, and (1) (2) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,..., nθ θ θ  are the estimates of θ on n subsamples 
each of size n-1. 
We repeat the simulation process based on 1000 draws for each jackknife 
iteration. We were not able to use a bootstrap to calculate the standard errors for our 
simulations because of the large number of non-convergences of our estimator on the 
bootstrapped samples. Efron (1981) demonstrates that the jackknife estimates of the 
standard errors are typically larger than the bootstrap estimates. 
Figure A1 demonstrates how well our simulations fit the actual distribution of per 
capita consumption in the total population and in the subgroups of households with 
different migration status. Each graph on Figure A1 shows three cumulative distributions. 
The solid line presents the cumulative distribution of the actual per capita expenditures 
generated from our sample of 3,620 observations. The consumption distribution that is 
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simulated using the estimated parameters of the system (1-3) and the estimated variance-
covariance matrix (A3) is shown as a dash line. The counterfactual distribution simulated 
under scenario of no migration is shown as a dotted line.  
Comparing the actual (solid line) and predicted (dash line) distributions for the 
total population demonstrates a reasonably good fit achieved by our simulations. The 
number of households with simulated expenditures below the poverty line is almost 
identical to the actual number of the poor households in our sample. The distribution 
simulated under scenario of no migration exhibits the first order dominance over the 
actual distributions. This indicates that relative to the actual consumption distribution the 
no-migration scenario would result in higher poverty rates regardless of the choice of the 
poverty line. Similar to results in Table 5, the no migration scenario has a largest negative 
impact for the consumption of households with domestic migrants.  
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Figure A1: Actual, simulated actual and counterfactual expenditure distribution under 
scenario of no migration for households with domestic migrants, international migrants, 
no migrants, and the total population. 
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Appendix 3 
Table A3.1: Multinomial probit estimation of the migration choice in the system (2-4) 
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 0.856* 0.439 -0.747 0.471 
   Share of international migrants in a ward, 2001 0.191 0.324 1.761*** 0.269 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.221*** 0.023 0.179*** 0.022 
   Share of children  0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children  4-7 -0.288 0.523 0.224 0.466 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.022 0.380 -0.599* 0.350 
   Share of men 16-64 1.501*** 0.468 0.272 0.463 
   Share of women 16-64 2.876*** 0.399 1.888*** 0.376 
   Share of elderly  4.334*** 0.487 1.428*** 0.505 
   Number of married couples -0.536*** 0.073 -0.127* 0.069 
Maximum education in the household 0.019 0.036 0.033 0.035 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.395** 0.169 0.004 0.142 
   Newar -0.321** 0.151 -0.634*** 0.176 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.223** 0.105 -0.160 0.102 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.364*** 0.119 -0.154 0.112 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.082 0.111 0.046 0.109 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.375*** 0.135 -0.144 0.129 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.236 0.150 -0.042 0.144 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.251 0.186 -0.264 0.185 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.085 0.103 -0.185* 0.101 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.062 0.110 -0.185* 0.105 
   Asset rich   (66th – 100th percentile) -0.471*** 0.136 -0.189 0.129 
Total pensions per capita -0.022 0.017 0.023** 0.012 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.975*** 0.206 0.805*** 0.220 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.774*** 0.267 1.476*** 0.273 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.778*** 0.245 0.676*** 0.261 
   Rural western Terai 0.898*** 0.261 1.050*** 0.268 
   Rural eastern Terai 1.146*** 0.237 1.196*** 0.248 
 Log of distance to market center -0.062 0.038 -0.023 0.036 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.639 0.448 0.102 0.435 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.509 0.658 0.700 0.636 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.293 0.726 0.637 0.697 
   % employed in wage job -0.221 0.513 0.669 0.444 
   % self employed 0.783** 0.307 -0.045 0.281 
   Log of average household expenditure, 1995 0.102 0.155 0.194 0.149 
   Gini coefficient , 1995 -0.191 0.662 -1.304** 0.616 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.034 0.077 -0.041 0.067 
Constant -4.511*** 1.502 -5.139*** 1.449 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -2,705.19 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A4.1: OLS estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4) 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.087*** 0.012 -0.084*** 0.011 -0.067*** 0.005 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.255 0.218 0.153 0.161 0.168* 0.092 
   Share of children 8-15 0.253 0.158 0.606*** 0.125 0.359*** 0.068 
   Share of men 16-64 0.433** 0.175 0.520*** 0.162 0.283*** 0.091 
   Share of women 16-64 0.629*** 0.160 0.702*** 0.140 0.843*** 0.077 
   Share of elderly  0.330** 0.160 0.460*** 0.170 0.424*** 0.111 
   Number of married couples 0.067** 0.034 0.052* 0.029 0.048*** 0.015 
Maximum education of women 0.034** 0.017 0.080*** 0.016 0.087*** 0.007 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.226*** 0.083 -0.247*** 0.057 -0.183*** 0.033 
   Newar -0.019 0.066 0.023 0.092 -0.009 0.029 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.127** 0.050 -0.142*** 0.046 -0.224*** 0.021 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.039 0.056 -0.178*** 0.049 -0.143*** 0.024 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.015 0.052 0.006 0.052 0.059*** 0.022 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.166*** 0.064 0.028 0.059 0.132*** 0.027 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.156** 0.067 0.110* 0.063 0.198*** 0.031 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.239*** 0.086 0.301*** 0.081 0.323*** 0.039 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.074 0.047 0.061 0.045 0.008 0.021 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.175*** 0.051 0.173*** 0.046 0.165*** 0.022 
   Asset rich   (66th – 100th percentile) 0.490*** 0.063 0.484*** 0.059 0.476*** 0.027 
Total pensions per capita 0.017** 0.009 0.022*** 0.005 0.014*** 0.003 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.058 0.098 0.052 0.118 0.222*** 0.038 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.048 0.123 -0.158 0.136 0.257*** 0.051 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.012 0.119 -0.158 0.135 0.136*** 0.047 
   Rural western Terai 0.168 0.125 -0.103 0.137 0.241*** 0.050 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.105 0.115 0.113 0.128 0.331*** 0.045 
 Log of distance to market center -0.035* 0.019 -0.020 0.016 -0.025*** 0.007 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.307 0.202 -0.251 0.195 -0.389*** 0.088 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education 0.024 0.291 -0.312 0.278 -0.135 0.135 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.465 0.328 -0.279 0.310 -0.616*** 0.146 
   % employed in wage job 0.011 0.269 -0.071 0.185 -0.127 0.096 
   % self employed -0.234 0.144 -0.103 0.119 -0.197*** 0.062 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.183*** 0.070 0.277*** 0.061 0.323*** 0.032 
   Gini coefficient, 1995 0.288 0.289 0.111 0.238 0.049 0.143 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.066 0.042 0.015 0.028 -0.010 0.014 
Constant -1.518** 0.693 -2.228*** 0.604 -2.827*** 0.309 
Number of observations 2,464 523 633 
Log-Likelihood -1,037.60 -236.84 -291.44 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A3.2: FIML estimation of the migration choice part of the system (2-4) with 
amounts of remittances. 
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 0.978*** 0.298 -0.463 0.336 
   Share of international migrants in a ward, 2001 0.192 0.230 1.260*** 0.193 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.159*** 0.017 0.127*** 0.016 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children 4-7 -0.174 0.373 0.172 0.330 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.020 0.273 -0.415* 0.248 
   Share of men 16-64 1.222*** 0.336 0.259 0.331 
   Share of women 16-64 1.990*** 0.286 1.316*** 0.266 
   Share of elderly  3.044*** 0.343 1.004*** 0.356 
   Number of married couples -0.383*** 0.052 -0.093* 0.049 
Maximum education in the household 0.001 0.026 0.020 0.025 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.275** 0.119 0.002 0.100 
   Newar -0.247** 0.106 -0.451*** 0.124 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.159** 0.075 -0.112 0.072 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.271*** 0.085 -0.108 0.079 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.061 0.078 0.034 0.077 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.255*** 0.095 -0.102 0.091 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.147 0.107 -0.025 0.102 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.167 0.132 -0.186 0.131 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.057 0.073 -0.132* 0.071 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.052 0.077 -0.133* 0.074 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) -0.321*** 0.096 -0.133 0.091 
Total pensions per capita -0.015 0.012 0.016* 0.008 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.690*** 0.145 0.565*** 0.155 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.533*** 0.188 1.033*** 0.193 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.555*** 0.173 0.473** 0.184 
   Rural western Terai 0.631*** 0.184 0.735*** 0.190 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.791*** 0.167 0.834*** 0.175 
 Log of distance to market center -0.041 0.027 -0.015 0.025 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.528* 0.313 0.054 0.308 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.488 0.464 0.471 0.452 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.206 0.511 0.453 0.492 
   % employed in wage job -0.066 0.359 0.486 0.314 
   % self employed 0.555** 0.216 -0.024 0.199 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.065 0.108 0.135 0.105 
   Gini coefficient, 1995 -0.033 0.466 -0.925** 0.435 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.024 0.053 -0.031 0.047 
Constant -3.186*** 1.052 -3.618*** 1.023 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,202.46 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A4.2: FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4) with amounts. 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Log  amount of  remittances  0.061*** 0.012 0.118*** 0.011   
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.102*** 0.015 -0.053*** 0.015 -0.073*** 0.007 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.244 0.210 0.102 0.148 0.174* 0.093 
   Share of children 8-15 0.249 0.154 0.536*** 0.115 0.357*** 0.069 
   Share of men 16-64 0.121 0.189 0.528*** 0.174 0.228** 0.095 
   Share of women 16-64 0.307* 0.182 0.771*** 0.180 0.753*** 0.092 
   Share of elderly  -0.178 0.212 0.455** 0.228 0.264* 0.135 
   Number of married couples 0.121*** 0.041 0.030 0.035 0.067*** 0.018 
Maximum education of women 0.025 0.017 0.071*** 0.014 0.086*** 0.007 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.142* 0.086 -0.200*** 0.056 -0.170*** 0.033 
   Newar 0.065 0.069 0.007 0.090 -0.002 0.031 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.075 0.051 -0.164*** 0.043 -0.218*** 0.022 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 0.030 0.057 -0.141*** 0.048 -0.133*** 0.025 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.016 0.051 -0.036 0.047 0.062*** 0.022 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.187*** 0.064 -0.026 0.057 0.143*** 0.028 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.167** 0.067 0.053 0.060 0.206*** 0.032 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.248*** 0.085 0.220*** 0.075 0.330*** 0.040 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.054 0.049 0.041 0.044 0.004 0.021 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.161*** 0.050 0.121*** 0.043 0.166*** 0.023 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.518*** 0.065 0.392*** 0.059 0.490*** 0.028 
Total pensions per capita 0.020** 0.009 0.022*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.003 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas -0.098 0.105 0.109 0.125 0.196*** 0.041 
   Rural west  mount/hills -0.064 0.134 -0.008 0.161 0.242*** 0.059 
   Rural eastern mount/hills -0.063 0.119 -0.083 0.131 0.116** 0.048 
   Rural western Terai 0.037 0.128 -0.027 0.141 0.220*** 0.053 
   Rural eastern Terai -0.066 0.122 0.149 0.138 0.301*** 0.049 
 Log of distance to market center -0.025 0.018 -0.024 0.015 -0.023*** 0.008 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.154 0.201 -0.158 0.185 -0.370*** 0.089 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education 0.099 0.290 -0.150 0.265 -0.118 0.136 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.568* 0.324 -0.167 0.286 -0.603*** 0.148 
   % employed in wage job 0.077 0.263 0.027 0.169 -0.117 0.098 
   % self employed -0.364** 0.144 -0.062 0.116 -0.222*** 0.064 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.136* 0.070 0.176*** 0.057 0.320*** 0.032 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.267 0.289 0.160 0.224 0.054 0.144 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.091** 0.040 0.016 0.027 -0.009 0.014 
Constant -0.537 0.738 -1.914*** 0.649 -2.783*** 0.314 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,202.46 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of  
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A3.3: FIML estimation of the migration choice part of the system (2-4) with 
amounts of remittances instrumented by age of the migrant. 
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 1.051*** 0.287 -0.421 0.334 
   Share of international migrants in a ward,  2001 0.174 0.228 1.273*** 0.191 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.158*** 0.017 0.127*** 0.016 
   Share of children  0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children  4-7 -0.192 0.372 0.164 0.330 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.056 0.273 -0.416* 0.248 
   Share of men 16-64 1.171*** 0.332 0.244 0.329 
   Share of women 16-64 1.987*** 0.284 1.310*** 0.265 
   Share of elderly  2.970*** 0.346 0.946*** 0.357 
   Number of married couples -0.379*** 0.051 -0.089* 0.049 
Maximum education in the household 0.004 0.026 0.023 0.025 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.269** 0.119 0.018 0.101 
   Newar -0.245** 0.106 -0.452*** 0.124 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.161** 0.074 -0.108 0.072 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.280*** 0.085 -0.105 0.080 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.061 0.078 0.036 0.077 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.248*** 0.096 -0.099 0.091 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.144 0.107 -0.028 0.102 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.157 0.132 -0.190 0.132 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.057 0.073 -0.134* 0.071 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.056 0.077 -0.140* 0.075 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) -0.324*** 0.096 -0.138 0.091 
Total pensions per capita -0.015 0.012 0.016* 0.008 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas     
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.700*** 0.145 0.566*** 0.155 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.556*** 0.190 1.040*** 0.193 
   Rural western Terai 0.570*** 0.173 0.479*** 0.184 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.650*** 0.184 0.739*** 0.189 
 Log of distance to market center 0.804*** 0.167 0.839*** 0.175 
Ward level variables -0.041 0.027 -0.015 0.025 
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.544* 0.312 0.031 0.307 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.550 0.463 0.417 0.448 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.198 0.511 0.413 0.495 
   % employed in wage job -0.053 0.358 0.484 0.315 
   % self employed 0.550** 0.216 -0.031 0.199 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.063 0.108 0.132 0.105 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.014 0.464 -0.917** 0.436 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.024 0.053 -0.035 0.048 
Constant -3.164*** 1.048 -3.564*** 1.023 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,263.28 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A4.3: FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4) with amounts of 
remittances instrumented by age of the migrant. 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Log  amount of  remittances  0.015 0.042 0.059 0.052   
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.117*** 0.017 -0.085*** 0.022 -0.074*** 0.006 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.306 0.220 0.103 0.164 0.175* 0.093 
   Share of children 8-15 0.275* 0.159 0.582*** 0.127 0.358*** 0.069 
   Share of men 16-64 0.148 0.191 0.402** 0.192 0.228** 0.094 
   Share of women 16-64 0.278 0.181 0.535** 0.223 0.749*** 0.091 
   Share of elderly  -0.190 0.203 0.245 0.249 0.261** 0.132 
   Number of married couples 0.146*** 0.042 0.063 0.040 0.067*** 0.018 
Maximum education of women 0.032* 0.018 0.076*** 0.016 0.086*** 0.007 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.147* 0.089 -0.217*** 0.060 -0.170*** 0.033 
   Newar 0.054 0.071 0.073 0.101 -0.002 0.031 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.074 0.053 -0.136*** 0.048 -0.218*** 0.022 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 0.026 0.059 -0.133** 0.054 -0.132*** 0.025 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.004 0.053 -0.016 0.055 0.062*** 0.022 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.209*** 0.068 0.025 0.067 0.143*** 0.028 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.178** 0.070 0.089 0.069 0.206*** 0.032 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.260*** 0.089 0.281*** 0.089 0.330*** 0.040 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.052 0.051 0.065 0.047 0.004 0.022 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.171*** 0.053 0.160*** 0.052 0.167*** 0.023 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.549*** 0.070 0.467*** 0.078 0.491*** 0.028 
Total pensions per capita 0.020** 0.009 0.022*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.003 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas       
   Rural west  mount/hills -0.106 0.107 -0.026 0.138 0.195*** 0.041 
   Rural eastern mount/hills -0.064 0.136 -0.240 0.184 0.241*** 0.059 
   Rural western Terai -0.094 0.124 -0.198 0.142 0.114** 0.048 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.037 0.132 -0.177 0.156 0.218*** 0.053 
 Log of distance to market center -0.073 0.124 0.008 0.152 0.299*** 0.049 
Ward level variables -0.024 
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.221 0.222 -0.209 0.197 -0.369*** 0.089 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education 0.054 0.309 -0.300 0.291 -0.115 0.136 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.525 0.338 -0.277 0.317 -0.603*** 0.148 
   % employed in wage job 0.098 0.273 -0.037 0.188 -0.117 0.098 
   % self employed -0.343** 0.151 -0.112 0.128 -0.223*** 0.064 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.146** 0.073 0.208*** 0.078 0.320*** 0.032 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.324 0.304 0.243 0.256 0.052 0.144 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.084* 0.043 0.030 0.030 -0.010 0.014 
Constant -0.504 0.751 -1.514* 0.790 -2.783*** 0.314 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,263.28 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A3.4: Full sample FIML estimation of the migration choice in the system (2-4).  
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 1.015*** 0.270 -0.404 0.322 
   Share of international migrants in a ward,  2001 0.052 0.213 1.151*** 0.184 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.177*** 0.016 0.142*** 0.015 
   Share of children  0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children  4-7 -0.292 0.360 0.095 0.324 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.128 0.263 -0.381 0.243 
   Share of men 16-64 1.181*** 0.299 0.213 0.304 
   Share of women 16-64 1.953*** 0.272 1.397*** 0.259 
   Share of elderly  1.898*** 0.288 0.184 0.312 
   Number of married couples -0.398*** 0.049 -0.096** 0.047 
Maximum education in the household 0.001 0.024 0.031 0.024 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.325*** 0.114 0.003 0.097 
   Newar -0.208** 0.102 -0.439*** 0.121 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.181** 0.072 -0.091 0.070 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.290*** 0.082 -0.090 0.078 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.060 0.075 0.023 0.075 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.226** 0.092 -0.108 0.089 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.135 0.102 -0.042 0.100 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.103 0.127 -0.203 0.129 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.055 0.071 -0.125* 0.070 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.061 0.074 -0.157** 0.073 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) -0.309*** 0.093 -0.118 0.089 
Total pensions per capita -0.014 0.010 0.011 0.007 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.708*** 0.140 0.546*** 0.150 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.601*** 0.180 1.010*** 0.187 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.569*** 0.166 0.447** 0.180 
   Rural western Terai 0.664*** 0.177 0.715*** 0.184 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.836*** 0.161 0.814*** 0.171 
 Log of distance to market center -0.030 0.026 -0.017 0.025 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.609** 0.302 0.023 0.299 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.674 0.444 0.447 0.431 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.045 0.489 0.425 0.481 
   % employed in wage job -0.182 0.346 0.477 0.310 
   % self employed 0.423** 0.209 0.007 0.194 
   Log of average household expenditure, 1995 0.066 0.103 0.122 0.102 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  -0.069 0.447 -0.926** 0.423 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.014 0.049 -0.047 0.046 
Constant -3.104*** 1.008 -3.550*** 0.995 
Number of observations 3874 
Log-Likelihood -4,548.17 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A4.4: Full Sample FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4) 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.124*** 0.015 -0.115*** 0.011 -0.080*** 0.007 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.354* 0.214 0.127 0.164 0.164* 0.091 
   Share of children 8-15 0.305** 0.155 0.613*** 0.126 0.374*** 0.068 
   Share of men 16-64 0.200 0.181 0.301* 0.161 0.324*** 0.087 
   Share of women 16-64 0.295* 0.178 0.331** 0.150 0.745*** 0.091 
   Share of elderly  -0.000 0.181 0.227 0.173 0.419*** 0.091 
   Number of married couples 0.160*** 0.040 0.098*** 0.030 0.062*** 0.017 
Maximum education of women 0.034** 0.017 0.083*** 0.016 0.084*** 0.007 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.127 0.087 -0.220*** 0.059 -0.175*** 0.032 
   Newar 0.019 0.068 0.095 0.084 0.006 0.030 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.058 0.052 -0.117** 0.046 -0.198*** 0.021 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 0.027 0.058 -0.140*** 0.051 -0.122*** 0.024 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha 0.016 0.052 0.005 0.051 0.056*** 0.021 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.231*** 0.064 0.073 0.060 0.131*** 0.027 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.199*** 0.068 0.119* 0.064 0.196*** 0.031 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.257*** 0.086 0.332*** 0.081 0.326*** 0.040 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.067 0.049 0.084* 0.046 0.025 0.021 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.195*** 0.051 0.201*** 0.047 0.182*** 0.022 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.567*** 0.065 0.544*** 0.060 0.501*** 0.027 
Total pensions per capita 0.017** 0.008 0.022*** 0.005 0.014*** 0.002 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas -0.091 0.107 -0.119 0.115 0.210*** 0.041 
   Rural west  mount/hills -0.082 0.131 -0.368*** 0.138 0.220*** 0.058 
   Rural eastern mount/hills -0.126 0.121 -0.274** 0.129 0.125*** 0.047 
   Rural western Terai 0.032 0.130 -0.268** 0.134 0.223*** 0.053 
   Rural eastern Terai -0.081 0.124 -0.075 0.125 0.312*** 0.049 
 Log of distance to market center -0.028 0.019 -0.018 0.016 -0.019*** 0.007 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.266 0.202 -0.215 0.197 -0.411*** 0.086 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.033 0.294 -0.383 0.283 -0.182 0.131 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.453 0.326 -0.362 0.314 -0.666*** 0.144 
   % employed in wage job 0.102 0.270 -0.080 0.191 -0.117 0.095 
   % self employed -0.281* 0.144 -0.173 0.124 -0.197*** 0.061 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.162** 0.071 0.247*** 0.063 0.314*** 0.031 
   Gini coefficient , 1995 0.325 0.294 0.300 0.249 0.103 0.138 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.060 0.040 0.034 0.028 -0.004 0.014 
Constant -0.639 0.733 -1.390** 0.647 -2.730*** 0.300 
Number of observations 3874 
Log-Likelihood -4,548.17 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A3.5: FIML estimation of the migration choice part of the system (2-4), where 
migration to India is treated as domestic migration. 
Base category: No Migration Nepal + India Migration Other abroad Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 0.620** 0.279 -0.214 0.465 
   Share of international migrants in a ward, 2001 0.664*** 0.188 1.322*** 0.249 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.157*** 0.014 0.119*** 0.022 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children 4-7 -0.029 0.314 0.132 0.445 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.151 0.231 -0.668* 0.341 
   Share of men 16-64 0.919*** 0.293 -0.141 0.436 
   Share of women 16-64 1.852*** 0.247 1.276*** 0.349 
   Share of elderly  2.402*** 0.312 1.267*** 0.437 
   Number of married couples -0.265*** 0.045 -0.145** 0.064 
Maximum education in the household -0.011 0.023 0.105*** 0.032 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.152 0.096 0.157 0.144 
   Newar -0.307*** 0.102 -0.268* 0.143 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.253*** 0.067 0.211** 0.092 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.202*** 0.073 -0.126 0.110 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha 0.002 0.070 -0.022 0.101 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.203** 0.084 -0.045 0.119 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.131 0.095 0.082 0.129 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.239** 0.122 -0.010 0.156 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) -0.016 0.064 -0.201* 0.109 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.123* 0.068 0.005 0.098 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) -0.383*** 0.086 0.080 0.110 
Total pensions per capita -0.026** 0.012   
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.621*** 0.136   
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.890*** 0.171 0.721*** 0.180 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.495*** 0.161 0.807*** 0.235 
   Rural western Terai 0.732*** 0.167 0.794*** 0.220 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.736*** 0.154 0.631*** 0.242 
 Log of distance to market center -0.039* 0.024 1.180*** 0.215 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.124 0.282 -0.435 0.391 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education 0.009 0.412 0.441 0.570 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.099 0.455 0.267 0.633 
   % employed in wage job 0.205 0.299 0.275 0.457 
   % self employed 0.311* 0.186 -0.178 0.276 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 -0.064 0.095 0.626*** 0.152 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.010 0.400 -2.035*** 0.631 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.055 0.045 0.031 0.070 
Constant -1.989** 0.925 -8.038*** 1.460 
Number of observations 3,620 
Log-Likelihood -4,061.94 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A4.5: FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4), where India is 
treated as domestic destination 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.109*** 0.012 -0.084*** 0.018 -0.071*** 0.008 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.238 0.155 0.059 0.249 0.167* 0.092 
   Share of children 8-15 0.486*** 0.113 0.465** 0.218 0.370*** 0.070 
   Share of men 16-64 0.326** 0.145 0.469* 0.269 0.274*** 0.095 
   Share of women 16-64 0.511*** 0.144 0.506** 0.229 0.796*** 0.104 
   Share of elderly  0.146 0.164 0.402 0.263 0.371*** 0.139 
   Number of married couples 0.102*** 0.028 0.038 0.049 0.054*** 0.018 
Maximum education of women 0.061*** 0.013 0.055** 0.025 0.085*** 0.008 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.239*** 0.055 -0.074 0.106 -0.183*** 0.033 
   Newar 0.081 0.067 -0.068 0.110 -0.001 0.032 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.047 0.044 -0.166** 0.074 -0.224*** 0.024 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.082* 0.044 0.015 0.087 -0.137*** 0.025 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.014 0.043 -0.061 0.076 0.059*** 0.022 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.135*** 0.052 -0.174* 0.089 0.135*** 0.028 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.147*** 0.056 -0.003 0.092 0.198*** 0.032 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.289*** 0.073 0.119 0.107 0.326*** 0.040 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.076** 0.037 0.104 0.089 0.010 0.022 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.186*** 0.040 0.158** 0.070 0.166*** 0.023 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.588*** 0.057 0.344*** 0.079 0.478*** 0.030 
Total pensions per capita 0.025*** 0.008 0.013** 0.006 0.013*** 0.003 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.019 0.099 -0.015 0.151 0.204*** 0.046 
   Rural west  mount/hills -0.161 0.122 -0.177 0.191 0.230*** 0.064 
   Rural eastern mount/hills -0.048 0.108 -0.233 0.176 0.120** 0.052 
   Rural western Terai -0.006 0.115 -0.104 0.194 0.223*** 0.056 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.074 0.110 -0.069 0.188 0.306*** 0.057 
 Log of distance to market center -0.021 0.014 -0.035 0.025 -0.025*** 0.008 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.358** 0.165 0.044 0.273 -0.384*** 0.088 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.287 0.235 -0.047 0.409 -0.143 0.135 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.156 0.267 -0.671 0.441 -0.629*** 0.146 
   % employed in wage job 0.014 0.174 -0.148 0.361 -0.129 0.096 
   % self employed -0.140 0.108 -0.177 0.202 -0.199*** 0.063 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.237*** 0.053 0.189 0.144 0.314*** 0.036 
   Gini coefficient , 1995 -0.020 0.212 1.032** 0.496 0.082 0.153 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.045* 0.027 0.001 0.057 -0.008 0.014 
Constant -1.422** 0.566 -1.035 1.461 -2.739*** 0.342 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,061.94 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
 57
Table A3.6: FIML estimation of the migration choice part of the system (2-4), assuming 
equal returns in earning equations.  
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 0.902*** 0.318 -0.465 0.335 
   Share of international migrants in a ward, 2001 0.061 0.232 1.128*** 0.193 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.159*** 0.017 0.131*** 0.015 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children 4-7 -0.224 0.370 0.147 0.321 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.062 0.271 -0.489** 0.242 
   Share of men 16-64 1.032*** 0.329 0.155 0.319 
   Share of women 16-64 2.046*** 0.283 1.286*** 0.261 
   Share of elderly  2.965*** 0.346 0.975*** 0.348 
   Number of married couples -0.380*** 0.051 -0.096** 0.048 
Maximum education in the household 0.001 0.026 0.011 0.025 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.294** 0.120 0.014 0.097 
   Newar -0.242** 0.107 -0.443*** 0.121 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.177** 0.075 -0.139** 0.070 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.287*** 0.086 -0.092 0.078 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.060 0.078 0.047 0.075 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.241** 0.096 -0.070 0.089 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.135 0.107 0.000 0.099 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.140 0.132 -0.168 0.128 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.062 0.073 -0.142** 0.069 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.043 0.077 -0.123* 0.072 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) -0.311*** 0.096 -0.122 0.088 
Total pensions per capita -0.014 0.012 0.013 0.008 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.710*** 0.146 0.577*** 0.152 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.585*** 0.189 1.114*** 0.188 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.571*** 0.173 0.525*** 0.180 
   Rural western Terai 0.667*** 0.183 0.793*** 0.185 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.822*** 0.167 0.854*** 0.171 
 Log of distance to market center -0.044 0.027 -0.017 0.025 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.499 0.315 -0.020 0.299 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.420 0.464 0.542 0.438 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.146 0.520 0.300 0.482 
   % employed in wage job -0.084 0.358 0.419 0.305 
   % self employed 0.542** 0.216 -0.042 0.193 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.075 0.109 0.151 0.102 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.028 0.466 -0.913** 0.422 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.022 0.052 -0.042 0.046 
Constant -3.284*** 1.061 -3.685*** 0.994 
Number of observations 3,620 
Log-Likelihood -4,317.41 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A4.6: FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4), assuming equal 
returns in earning equations.  
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.080*** 0.005 -0.080*** 0.005 -0.080*** 0.005 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.206*** 0.077 0.206*** 0.077 0.206*** 0.077 
   Share of children 8-15 0.408*** 0.057 0.408*** 0.057 0.408*** 0.057 
   Share of men 16-64 0.377*** 0.075 0.377*** 0.075 0.377*** 0.075 
   Share of women 16-64 0.658*** 0.074 0.658*** 0.074 0.658*** 0.074 
   Share of elderly  0.335*** 0.092 0.335*** 0.092 0.335*** 0.092 
   Number of married couples 0.074*** 0.014 0.074*** 0.014 0.074*** 0.014 
Maximum education of women 0.078*** 0.006 0.078*** 0.006 0.078*** 0.006 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.181*** 0.028 -0.181*** 0.028 -0.181*** 0.028 
   Newar 0.002 0.027 0.002 0.027 0.002 0.027 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.187*** 0.019 -0.187*** 0.019 -0.187*** 0.019 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.124*** 0.021 -0.124*** 0.021 -0.124*** 0.021 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha 0.047** 0.019 0.047** 0.019 0.047** 0.019 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.129*** 0.024 0.129*** 0.024 0.129*** 0.024 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.185*** 0.027 0.185*** 0.027 0.185*** 0.027 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.301*** 0.033 0.301*** 0.033 0.301*** 0.033 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.168*** 0.019 0.168*** 0.019 0.168*** 0.019 
   Asset rich   (66th – 100th percentile) 0.503*** 0.024 0.503*** 0.024 0.503*** 0.024 
Total pensions per capita 0.017*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.002 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.157*** 0.037 0.157*** 0.037 0.157*** 0.037 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.154*** 0.052 0.154*** 0.052 0.154*** 0.052 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.066 0.043 0.066 0.043 0.066 0.043 
   Rural western Terai 0.166*** 0.047 0.166*** 0.047 0.166*** 0.047 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.242*** 0.043 0.242*** 0.043 0.242*** 0.043 
 Log of distance to market center -0.024*** 0.006 -0.024*** 0.006 -0.024*** 0.006 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.328*** 0.075 -0.328*** 0.075 -0.328*** 0.075 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.141 0.113 -0.141 0.113 -0.141 0.113 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.402*** 0.125 -0.402*** 0.125 -0.402*** 0.125 
   % employed in wage job -0.081 0.083 -0.081 0.083 -0.081 0.083 
   % self employed -0.214*** 0.053 -0.214*** 0.053 -0.214*** 0.053 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.291*** 0.027 0.291*** 0.027 0.291*** 0.027 
   Gini coefficient , 1995 0.086 0.115 0.086 0.115 0.086 0.115 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.012 
Constant -2.332*** 0.283 -2.703*** 0.285 -2.561*** 0.260 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,317.41 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. 
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Table A5: Simulated changes in expenditure, poverty and inequality rates for different  
migration scenarios (standard errors in parenthesis). 
 
Migration scenarios Actual No  migration 
Level of  
migration 
as in 1995-96 
+10% point  
increase in  
domestic 
migration 
+10% point  
increase in  
international 
migration 
Household types Poverty rate (changes in percentage points) 
 
All Households 
 
30.0  
 
+3.6* 
(2.1) 
+1.8* 
(0.9) 
-2.4* 
(1.3) 
-0.5 
(1.1) 
Households with no 
migrants 
30.6 
 0 0 
-3* 
(1.4) 
-1.3 
(1.9) 
Households with 
migrants within Nepal 
22.9 
 
+23.4* 
(9.4) 
+7.1* 
(3.6) 0 
+2.6 
(2.8) 
Households with 
migrants abroad 
32.8 
 
+2.1 
(7.3) 
+4.4 
(4.2) 
-2.1 
(2.5) 0 
 Average expenditure, NRP 10,000’s 
 
All Households 
 
1.493 
 
-0.088* 
(0.046) 
-0.047* 
(0.022) 
+0.068* 
(0.041) 
+0.022 
(0.037) 
Households with no 
migrants 
1.493 
 0 0 
+0.092* 
(0.050) 
+0.043 
(0.061) 
Households with 
migrants within Nepal 
1.576 
 
-0.489* 
(0.188) 
-0.175* 
(0.079) 0 
-0.049 
(0.060) 
Households with 
migrants abroad 
1.441 
 
-0.1 
(0.177) 
-0.113 
(0.100) 
+0.037 
(0.080) 
0 
 
 Inequality rate (Gini) 
 
All  Households 
 
0.409 
 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
+0.003 
(0.005) 
+0.003 
(0.004) 
